NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

PRISON RADICALIZATION: THE NEW EXTREMIST TRAINING GROUNDS?

by

McKinley D. Coffin, Jr.

September 2007

Thesis Advisor:	David Brannan
Second Reader:	Lauren F. Wollman

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			*Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188*
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (*Leave blank*)	**2. REPORT DATE** September 2007	**3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED** Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Prison Radicalization: The New Extremist Training Grounds?			**5. FUNDING NUMBERS**
6. AUTHOR(S) McKinley D. Coffin, Jr.			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			**10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER**
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			**12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE** A
13. ABSTRACT (*maximum 200 words*) As a nation with the largest prison population in the world, the United States has all the ingredients for criminals, extremists, and religious radicals to collaborate in producing a new breed of homegrown terrorist. Although there are documented cases where homegrown prison converts have conducted or provided material support for terrorist operations both domestically and internationally, the phenomenon is still a relatively new concern for U.S. homeland security. This thesis uses survey and interview methodologies to assess the opinions of correctional officers and experts as to the extent of the problem, as well as identifying gaps in intelligence, training, and strategy. The results suggest that prisons are fertile recruiting grounds for disaffected inmates that may be influenced by charismatic extremists acting under the guise of religion or politics. However, the results also point to a disconnect between corrections and other homeland security disciplines that prevents the creation of a robust information sharing environment. This study's conclusions indicate that a comprehensive and effective strategy cannot be developed without first acknowledging that the problem exists, understanding the rudimentary contributing factors, and initiating discussion on a multi-faceted approach to counter the radical influence.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Prison, Radicalization, Extremists, Corrections, Information Sharing Environment, Intelligence			**15. NUMBER OF PAGES** 99
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	**18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE** Unclassified	**19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT** Unclassified	**20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT** UU

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

PRISON RADICALIZATION: THE NEW EXTREMIST TRAINING GROUNDS?

McKinley D. Coffin, Jr.
Captain, Volusia County (Florida) Sheriff's Office
B.A., Warner Southern College, 1998
M.S., National University, 2005

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2007**

Author: McKinley D. Coffin, Jr.

Approved by: David Brannan, Ph.D.
                 Thesis Advisor

                 Lauren F. Wollman, Ph.D.
                 Second Reader

                 Douglas Porch, Ph.D.
                 Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

As a nation with the largest prison population in the world, the United States has all the ingredients for criminals, extremists, and religious radicals to collaborate in producing a new breed of homegrown terrorist. Although there are documented cases where homegrown prison converts have conducted or provided material support for terrorist operations both domestically and internationally, the phenomenon is still a relatively new concern for U.S. homeland security. This thesis uses survey and interview methodologies to assess the opinions of correctional officers and experts as to the extent of the problem, as well as identifying gaps in intelligence, training, and strategy. The results suggest that prisons are fertile recruiting grounds for disaffected inmates that may be influenced by charismatic extremists acting under the guise of religion or politics. However, the results also point to a disconnect between corrections and other homeland security disciplines that prevents the creation of a robust information sharing environment. This study's conclusions indicate that a comprehensive and effective strategy cannot be developed without first acknowledging that the problem exists, understanding the rudimentary contributing factors, and initiating discussion on a multi-faceted approach to counter the radical influence.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Finally, this thesis represents more than a year of hard work and perseverance that I hope will be carried forward by others. It is dedicated to the memory of my best friend, Mike Bowes, whom I miss very much and think about every day.

LIST OF SYMBOLS, ACRONYMS, AND/OR ABBREVIATIONS

ACA	American Correctional Association
ADL	Anti-Defamation League
ALF	Animal Liberation Front
BOP	Federal Bureau of Prisons
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOJ	Department of Justice
ELF	Earth Liberation Front
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
ISNA	Islamic Society of North America
JIS	Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Sheeh
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
KKK	Ku Klux Klan
NAAWS	North American Association of Wardens and Superintendents
NYPD	New York Police Department
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
STG	Security Threat Groups
STIU	Security Threat Intelligence Unit
TEW	Terrorism Early Warning Group
UK	United Kingdom

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The importance of ideological extremist activities in America's prisons as a potential recruiting pool for foreign and domestic terrorist groups is a developing concern for homeland security officials. The physical and psychological vulnerability of being imprisoned in an atmosphere that deprives inmates of all but the most basic of privileges provides the opportunity for extremists to establish bonds with individuals through social networks and constitutionally protected activities. These activities "foster identity construction (or reconstruction) and encourage social bonds that facilitate joining by creating a new social network and solidarity to encourage individuals to stay the course and continue"[1] upon parole or release back into society. It is this situation that places inmates in an environment to be recruited by ideological extremists and converted to radicalization.

While the Office of the Inspector general (OIG) provided an April 2004 review of the policies and procedures for the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) as they relate to Muslim religious service providers, deficiencies still exist in restricting messages of hate and anti-government propaganda to inmates as part of religious activities.[2] The problem goes beyond spreading hate-filled material that may cause a problem internally for prison officials. Political expressions of free speech by incarcerated members of right-wing and left-wing anti-government groups may also contribute to the development of extremist views that carry over to terrorist activities outside of prison walls. Training for prison staff needs to be implemented to recognize legitimate religious or free speech activities from the extremist threat and interrupt the cycle of radicalization before it results in

---

[1] Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam,* Paper presented at Yale University's The Roots of Islamic Radicalism Conference (New Haven, May 10, 2004), 10 at http://www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/papers/wiktorowicz-paper.pdf (Accessed August 16, 2006).

[2] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 2004) at http://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/justice/nps03-050604-14.pdf (Accessed August 16, 2006).

another terrorist attack against the United States. Identifying the sources of the problem, tracking the conversion rates and activities of inmates inside and outside of prison, and delivering credible intelligence products to homeland security practitioners presents a significant challenge for a country that has the largest prison population in the world.

B.   PROBLEM HISTORY

The problem of prison radicalization is not new, nor is the problem limited to the United States. Richard Reid was introduced to radical Islam while incarcerated in London's Feltham Young Offender's Institution for crimes committed as a gang member when he began the conversion that would lead him to attempt to blow up an American Airlines flight bound for Miami. Upon his release from prison, Reid's radicalization was nourished by sermons from well-known radical clerics such as Abu Hamza al-Masri at the same Finnsbury Park mosque attended by convicted 9/11 terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui.[3]

The leader of the failed London subway and bus bombings in July 2005 converted to Islam while incarcerated at the same institution as Richard Reid. Muktar Said Ibrahim was seventeen years old and already serving a five-year sentence for multiple knife assaults as a member of a street gang. His conversion to Islam led him to the same Finnsbury Park radical mosques as Reid and Moussaoui where he developed his religious radicalization.[4] He is awaiting trial on conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to cause explosions likely to endanger life or cause serious injury.

Although they were introduced to radical Islam in prison, there is no verifiable evidence that Reid or Ibrahim progressed beyond conversion in the radicalization process until they were released and sought out extremist ideology on their own. At the very least though, prison provided an introduction to radical Islam and set into motion the ideology that would have a significant impact upon their lives. An example of direct connections between extremists in prison and radicalization can be found in the case of Levar Haley Washington who joined the radical Islamic prison group Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Sheeh

---

[3] Michael Elliot, "The Shoe Bomber's World," *Time*, February 25, 2002, 47-50.

[4] Sarah Lyall, "In Britain, Migrants Took a New Path: To Terrorism," *New York Times*, July 28, 2005, A10.

(JIS) while in the California State Prison in Sacramento. Washington conspired with other JIS members to conduct terrorist acts upon his release from prison in November 2004.[5] While in prison, Washington was influenced by JIS founder and radical Muslim Kevin Lamar James and participated in a coordinated effort to fund terrorist activity by committing armed robberies.[6] Jamal Ahmidan is another example of an inmate who embarked on a path to radicalization in a Spanish prison that would eventually lead to his participation in the 2004 Madrid train bombings. These cases are only a few of the most recent examples where prisons played a critical part in creating terrorists who would eventually become actively involved in an attack.

These cases also draw attention to the developing associations between criminal gangs and extremist groups in prisons. Although training is available to line personnel who seek to educate themselves on gang activity and extremist groups, this is an area that deserves more attention to bring an understanding of the threat to a higher level. Prison officials have recognized the value of collecting information on prison gang activity and the creation of Security Threat Intelligence Units to track these threats have produced good intelligence products for law enforcement investigations, reduced violence and saved lives. A portion of the hypothesis set forth in this thesis is that similar efforts applied to radicalizing extremists in prison would bring similar desirable effects.

Iranian proselytizing of inmates in U.S. prisons, to include the recruitment, indoctrination and instruction of radical Islam, has been occurring since the late 1970s.[7] The threat of radical Islamist infiltration in the American prison system presents a significant challenge for corrections and law enforcement. In many ways, this concern reflects the overall anxiety of the international terrorist communities' capacity to enlist support amongst the disenfranchised members of society to champion their political agendas. The pool of potential recruits far outweighs the available intelligence and

---

[5] United States Department of Justice, "Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges Related to Conspiracy to Attack Military Facilities, Other Targets," press release (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2005) at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/August/05_crm_453.htm (Accessed August 9, 2006).

[6] Ibid.

[7] Gregory R. Copley, "Handling radical, terrorist and politicized prisoners," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 30, no.1 (January 2002): 9.

security resources to effectively deal with the growing problem. Therefore, it is imperative that we understand the threat before developing the strategy that will determine our course of action.

1.   Divergent Sects

All of the September 11, 2001 terrorists practiced a form of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism or Salifism. While both movements are puritanical,l there are differences that should be pointed out to illustrate how some sects can be more radical than others and subsequently offer a stronger appeal to potential recruits. Wahhibists are followers of an eighteenth-century reformist who sought to restore the fundamentalist practices of Islam to the Qur'an and reunite Muslims in what is now known as Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism became the officially recognized sect of Islam in Saudi Arabia and is the predominant influence in most national Islamic organizations in the United States. Although Wahhibists are generally iconoclastic and intolerant of influences outside the original teachings of the Qur'an and Hadith, followers will recognize the subsequent religious commentaries and injunctions issued by respected modern Islamic scholars.[8] Prior to 2003, the Wahhabi-based Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) was the key organization that endorsed and trained Muslim chaplains for the BOP and the U.S. military.[9] Salifists recognize only the Qur'an and Hadith as the ultimate religious authority and oppose the initiation of modern interpretations by religious experts "on the grounds that it arrogates to humans a right to legislate which is reserved (only) to God."[10] Both the Taliban and al Qaeda emerged from this movement that seeks to divide the world between fundamental Islamic ideology and modern western influence. Simply because a Muslim adheres to a Wahhabi or Salifi orientation does not mean he is predisposed to radicalism or will engage in terrorist activity.[11] However, Salifism is one sect associated with radical Islamic fundamentalists where there is evidence on the part of

---

[8] Nadav Morag, Faculty, Naval Postgraduate School, Electronic communication with the author, September 14, 2006.

[9] U.S. DOJ, OIG, 18.

[10] Amhad Dallal, "Appropriating the Past: Twentieth-Century Reconstruction of Pre-Modern Islamic Thought," *Islamic Law and Society* 7, no.3. (2000): 325.

[11] U.S. DOJ, OIG, 4.

some extremists of their exploitation of religious beliefs to further terrorist activity in this form of Islam. For example, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi can be considered neo-Salifists who have used the legitimate practice of Islamic scholarship to justify the killing of civilians, including other Muslims of their own sect, to perpetuate their violent political agendas and terrorist organization.

Martyrs for Morocco is a terrorist group that has its origin in Spain's prison system and is connected to the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. The prison population provided the support base for acquiring the explosives and the network to plan and execute the attacks.[12] These radical Islamists are the prototype for prison integration in the United States because of their willingness to distort their beliefs to suit their mission. Martyrs for Morocco adhere to the neo-fascist ideology of *Takfir wal-Hijra*, which allows followers to engage in any activity that advances jihad even if the Qur'an strictly forbids it.

Men are permitted to shave their beards, drink alcoholic beverages, and adopt western culture to disguise their activities.[13] The *Takfir* ideology is dominant at the Finnsbury Park mosque that Moussaoui and Reid attended and is also connected to al Qaeda's top strategist Ayman al-Zawahiri.[14] Rationalizing immoral and illegal activity to further jihad may have a strong appeal to the homegrown criminal element in prisons that would otherwise reject conversion under the rigid tenets of fundamentalist religion. Understanding the differences in fundamentalist forms of Islam is an inherent weakness in Western law enforcement and corrections culture, but important in identifying potential contributors of radical ideology in prisons.

---

[12] Sarah Bar, Sharon Marek, Blair Mersinger, and Louise Shelley, "An Investigation into the North African Crime-Terror Nexus," *Paper presented at the American University Transnational Crime and Terrorism Seminar*, (Washington, D.C.: American University, December 19, 2005), at http://www.american.edu/traccc/resources/publications/students/bar01.pdf (Accessed March 17, 2007).

[13] Bruce Livesey, "The Salifist Movement," *PBS Frontline*, January 25, 2005 at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html (Accessed March 11, 2007).

[14] Elliot, "Shoe Bomber's World," 47-50.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

To improve our overall homeland security detection and prevention capabilities, this thesis identifies gaps in intelligence collection and reporting of extremist activities in America's prisons and the best practices to address the problem. The specific questions it asks are: What gaps exist in intelligence collection and reporting of extremist activities in America's prisons? What role do Security Threat Intelligence Units play in identifying, collecting, and reporting of information and intelligence on prison radicalization? What is the relationship between criminal gangs and radical extremists in prisons? How should prison staff be trained to cope with prison radicalization?

D. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM

Prison radicalization is generating a great deal of interest as evidenced by the number of newspaper and magazine articles on the topic in the past few years. As the public and academia become more aware of the threat that exists inside our prisons, the pressure to come up with an effective response will present a challenge for homeland security leaders. Tracking ideological extremist activity in prisons by developing a strategy for intelligence collection and reporting will represent the first step in breaking the cycle of radicalization. This research contributes to the academic literature on prison radicalization by going beyond recognizing the danger to homeland security and recommending policy options for state and federal correctional institutions to counter the threat.

The primary audience for this research are senior management level officials in both state and federal corrections. This thesis adds to the growing body of literature by assessing what experts in the field believe the extent of the problem to be and the current best practices being employed to combat the threat. The results should encourage corrections and law enforcement officials to narrow the gap in the intelligence function by identifying training opportunities, strengthening interagency communication, and developing partnerships to share information at the state and federal levels.

E.   LITERATURE REVIEW

This section briefly discusses the literature underpinning the topic of radicalization in America's prisons and the associated uncertainty created from gaps in intelligence collection and reporting as it relates to the conversion process; the relationship between security threat groups and extremists; and the need to identify and monitor the threat to national security.

Although extremist activity in prisons has been discussed among law enforcement for many years, there is limited academic literature directly related to this thesis. The literature is divided into three categories: government reports that provide a demographic framework for prison population and identifying prison radicalization; scholarly commentary on the social forces that influence religious conversion to radical Islam; and non-governmental reports that describe the relationships between criminals and extremists in prisons.

The government reports are subdivided into FBI and Department of Justice reviews of the radical Islamic influence in prisons and expert testimony before Senate committees by government officials that identify a possible nexus between extremists and criminal gangs. There are more than 162,000 prisoners currently incarcerated in the federal prison system nationwide.[15] In a 2004 report on Muslim religious service providers the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) estimates that "about six percent of the total population seek Islamic religious services."[16] Using the definition of Security Threat Groups (STG) as the standard of reference, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that 12% of the total prison population engages in illegal activities as a group.[17] In this survey 277 state prisons in forty-five states were used to survey 13,986 inmates about their gang activity.[18] Not surprisingly, 91% were repeat offenders, 69% engaged in illegal drug

---

[15] Federal Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Population, at http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp (Accessed September 7, 2006).

[16] U.S. DOJ, OIG, 5.

[17] U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Survey of State Prison Inmates 1991* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1993), 20.

[18] Ibid.

transactions, and 73% were directly involved in violent offenses.[19] As of June 2005 there were 1,438,701 inmates in state and federal prisons, which would put the number of inmates in STG status at 172,644 assuming there is no change in the percent of the total population that meets the criteria. The number of prison converts to Islam is estimated to be between 300,000 and 350,000 nationally and is growing about 10 percent each year.[20] These numbers present a considerable problem for law enforcement if connections continue to develop between terrorists groups and criminal gangs.

Islamic services are provided mostly by volunteers and contractors due to the shortage of Muslim chaplains in the BOP system. Where volunteers and contractors are not available then other inmates lead Islamic services. In the BOP report, the Inspector General sharply criticized the oversight of Islamic religious service providers citing that "ample opportunity exists for them to deliver inappropriate and extremist messages without supervision from BOP staff members."[21] This provides extremists with the chance to seek out and cultivate potential recruits that will embrace the radical Islamic ideology.

Conversion is the first stage in the radicalization process. A May 2006 FBI Intelligence Assessment analyzed the radicalization process and broke it down to four steps that could lead an individual to participate in a terrorist attack. In the second stage, the strength of the new commitment is tested through separation from the convert's former life and embracing the new ideology.[22] Prison prevents these individuals from traveling abroad to immerse themselves in the Islamic culture so their sole influence is limited to the ideology of the extremist imam and whatever propaganda gets past prison officials. Islam in this context is frequently distorted to "encompass prison values such as

---

[19] U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Survey of State Prison Inmates 1991* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1993), 20.

[20] San Francisco State University, Center for Integration and Improvement of Journalism, *Media Guide to Islam*, September 2004, at http://mediaguidetoislam.sfsu.edu/intheus/06c_converts.htm (Accessed August 24, 2006). Siraj Islam Mufti, "Islam in American Prisons," *IslamOnline*, August 31, 2001, at http://www.islamonline.net/english/views/2001/08/article20.shtml (Accessed August 24, 2006).

[21] U.S. DOJ, OIG, 3.

[22] U.S. Department of Justice, FBI Counterterrorism Division, *The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 2006), 6-7. FOUO.

gangs and loyalty to other inmates"[23] and is referred to as Prison Islam. The report maintains that the radicalization process does not produce direct terrorist action in each case and the cycle can be broken or halted at any point.

The FBI has conducted investigations on criminal enterprises with direct connections to terrorism, both domestically and abroad. In testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee in February 2005, FBI Director Robert Mueller described increasing concern about the connections between organized crime and terrorism. A transcript of that testimony provides insight to the nexus of the future threat: "Middle Eastern Criminal Enterprises involved in the organized theft and resale of infant formula pose not only an economic threat, but a public health threat to infants, and a potential source of material support to a terrorist organization."[24] The organizing of extremists with prison gangs known to engage in continuing criminal enterprise inside and outside of prisons should be of particular concern for law enforcement yet little research exists to define the extent of the current threat.

The government reports are useful in describing the threat that extremists in America's prison system pose to the pool of potential recruits and ultimately to society at large, but they fall short in recommending a strategy to manage the risk. Corrections and law enforcement officials should be working toward a unified approach to share intelligence and disrupt efforts to radicalize and recruit inmates in support of terrorist activities.

While the phenomenon of prison radicalization is not new, it has only recently earned the attention of the academic community and consists mostly of anecdotal chronicles of high-profile extremists. Richard Reid, Jose Padilla, and Levar Washington represent a dangerous trend of converts to Islam who turned into active terrorists and were heavily influenced by radical ideology while in prison. Empirical data on the subject of radicalization of prison inmates is limited and the connection between terrorists and recruiting in U.S. prisons has not received much attention in homeland security research.

---

[23] U.S. DOJ, OIG, 8.

[24] Robert S. Mueller, III, *Testimony of FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, before the Senate Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate*, 109th Congress, 1st Session, February 16, 2005, 3 at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller021605.htm (Accessed August 30, 2006).

There are several reasons for the gap in knowledge and they include a fundamental failure to recognize the threat, the natural reluctance of extremist elements in the United States to identify themselves for public scrutiny, and prison officials' unwillingness to acknowledge that a systemic problem may exist and allow access to researchers who may draw attention to policy failures. In the studies that are available, the vast majority of Muslim prison converts sampled were African-American and selection bias may play a role in the results.[25]

Randy Borum and Michael Gelles are associate professors for the Department of Mental Health Law and Policy at the University of South Florida and they report that al Qaeda's interest in dirty bomb suspect Jose Padilla indicates that terrorist organizations may be seeking to recruit homegrown Islamic converts willing to support attacks against the United States, either by direct participation or through material support.[26] Any discussion of clandestine recruitment of homegrown converts in prison requires an examination of the social influences that contribute to understanding the underlying cause in the conversion process. The literature collectively identifies identity crisis as a necessary variable in the transformation to radical ideology. According to Rhodes College social scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz:

> …socialization (or resocialization) takes place as individuals learn about the ideology of the movement. The process is intended to alter the values of the individual so that self-interest is defined in accordance with the goals and beliefs of the movement ideology. In addition, movements foster identity construction (or reconstruction) and encourage social bonds that facilitate joining by creating new social network and solidarity to encourage individuals to stay the course and continue training.[27]

This concept is supported by RAND analysts Scott Gerwehr and Sara Daly when they describe Richard Reid as undergoing "identity transformation" during his prison conversion to radical Islam and subsequent failed attempt to detonate explosives aboard

---

[25] U.S. DOJ, OIG, 5.

[26] Randy Borum and Michael Gelles, "Al-Qaeda's Operational Evolution: Behavioral and Organizational Perspectives," *Behavioral Sciences and the Law* 23, no. 4 (July/August 2005): 480.

[27] Wiktorowicz, "Joining the Cause," 16.

an American Airlines flight in December 2001.[28] This transformation process is noteworthy because little training exists for correctional officers to recognize and report emerging associations between extremists and impressionable recruits.

In 2002, the Anti-Defamation League published a report entitled "Dangerous Convictions: An Introduction to Extremist Activities in Prisons" where it identifies the internal sources of radicalization within prisons. The report concludes that prison gangs play a major role in the spread of fundamentalist ideology. The ADL's study makes the attempt to link divergent ideological extremists through common cause association.

> The evidence that larceny often trumps racial purity can be seen when gangs of different racial make-ups form "alliances" in order to strengthen their control of money-making ventures behind prison walls. The Aryan Brotherhood, for example, evinces considerable hostility towards black prison gangs, such as the Black Guerilla Family, as might be expected. However, it is broadly aligned with the Mexican Mafia, in order to control the drug trade to mutual benefit (and as a result opposes the rivals of the Mexican Mafia, La Nuestra Familia).[29]

The ADL report lightly touches upon what may be the most significant internal threat to our domestic security when it comes to radicalization in prisons. This emerging threat is consistent with a more recent George Washington University/University of Virginia report on prisoner radicalization that draws attention to the lack of systematic intelligence collection and information sharing on the association between organized prison gangs and international terrorist organizations.[30] The report characterizes the most likely terrorist recruit as young, unemployed, alienated, lacking self-esteem, with a desire

---

[28] Scott Gerwehr and Sara Daly, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," in *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook*, ed. by David G. Kamien (New York, McGraw-Hill, 2006), 86.

[29] Anti-Defamation League, *Dangerous Conviction: An Introduction to Extremist Activities in Prisons* (Washington, D.C.: ADL, 2002), 10, at http://www.adl.org/learn/Ext_Terr/dangerous_convictions.pdf (Accessed September 2, 2006).

[30] Frank Cilluffo, Gregory Saathoff, Jan Lane, Sharon Cardash, Josh Magarik, Andrew Whitehead, Jeffrey Raynor, Arnold Bogis, & Gina Lohr, "Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization," *A Special Report by the Homeland Security Policy Institute at The George Washington University and the Critical Incident Analysis Group at The University of Virginia* (Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University, September 2006), 8, at http://www.heathsystem.virginia.edu/internet/ciag/publications/out_of_the_shadows.pdf (Accessed September 19, 2006).

to belong to a group.[31] This seemingly would include the vast majority of the U.S. prison population, yet another study states the "the person who becomes a terrorist in Western countries is generally both intellectual and idealistic."[32] The lack of agreement about the demographics of terrorist recruits is an indicator of the limited data associated with modern domestic terrorism and the evolving nature of the threat. More research is needed to make the connection of alliances between domestic criminal gangs and extremists in prison.

The literature reveals that some states have more of a concern than others. According to *Time* magazine's Los Angeles Bureau Chief Terry McCarthy, there are more than 100,000 gang members in California prisons being released back into society at a rate of about 3% each month.[33] However, as of June 2005 the total prison population in California was 166,532, which indicates that 60% of the state's prison population now falls into the STG classification.[34] This is much higher than the 12% national average and comparable with data collected by the National Gang Crime Research Center.[35] It is likely that states such as California, Illinois, New York, and Texas have much higher STG prison density rates due to the higher ratio of total gang members in those states. As discussed above, the literature has failed to adequately address the topic of radicalization in prisons and has only recently recognized the emerging association of criminal gangs

[31] Frank Cilluffo, Gregory Saathoff, Jan Lane, Sharon Cardash, Josh Magarik, Andrew Whitehead, Jeffrey Raynor, Arnold Bogis, & Gina Lohr, "Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization," *A Special Report by the Homeland Security Policy Institute at The George Washington University and the Critical Incident Analysis Group at The University of Virginia* (Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University, September 2006), 8, at http://www.heathsystem.virginia.edu/internet/ciag/publications/out_of_the_shadows.pdf (Accessed September 19, 2006), 1.

[32] Rex A. Hudson, *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* (Washington, D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September 1999), 24.

[33] Terry McCarthy, "L.A. Gangs are Back," *Time,* September 3, 2001, 46.

[34] U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2005*, NCJ 213133 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2006), 3.

[35] George W. Knox, "The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat Groups (STGs) in American Prisons Today: Recent Research Findings from the 2004 Prison Gang Survey," *National Gang Crime Research Center* (2005), at http://www.ngcrc.com/corr2006.html (Accessed September 3, 2006).

and radical fundamentalists. This condition offers corrections and law enforcement officials important policy and strategy challenges as it relates to preparation and prevention efforts in homeland security.

While prison radicalization is not a new problem worldwide, it is becoming a contemporary threat for domestic security in the United States. The existing literature reflects a problem that has not received much attention until recently and a few uncertainties and gaps exist beyond simply identifying the problem. These gaps are of particular importance to federal and state prison policymakers who are trying to develop strategies to prevent and respond to radicalization. Is the Security Threat Group (STG) model the best available method to identify and track extremists in prisons or should the Federal Bureau of Prisons concentrate on the Imam-vetting procedures as the best method to reduce radicalization? These questions have yet to be answered and the existing literature does not sufficiently address the effectiveness of various policy considerations. This research attempts to fill that void by discussing resource commitments, potential unintended consequences, and cost considerations.

F.   OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS

Chapter II explains the methodology used to conduct the analysis. In particular, it describes the process of constructing the survey instrument, sample selection, mechanics of distributing and collecting survey data, and the data analysis. The analytical methodology includes descriptive and inferential statistical methods, in addition to identifying potential biases and limitations.

Chapter III details the results of the survey and is comprised of a descriptive and inferential statistical analysis to identify patterns and define what the survey population believes is significant about the problem of prison radicalization.

From this data, interviews of professionals with special insights into the topic is conducted to add qualitative observations for a more in-depth understanding of the influences that affect prison radicalization, which is reported in Chapter IV.

Chapter V provides an analysis of the quantitative and qualitative results in the previous two chapters.

Based on the findings in the previous chapters and what the existing research shows to be viable solutions, Chapter VI makes policy recommendations to address prison radicalization and explores potential problems that may arise during implementation. Any problems with the data or limitations of the research are addressed in this chapter. Finally, recommendations for further research are identified.

II.   METHODOLOGY

A.   SURVEY METHODOLOGY

To gather data that help to answer the research questions, an electronic survey was used to assess the attitudes of experts in the field of corrections and law enforcement toward radicalization activities in state and federal prisons. The intention was to have mid to senior management level personnel in these disciplines complete the survey, but this may not have been possible in some cases so there was some flexibility in who actually completed the survey.

The population for the survey was state prison, local/county jail, and detention facility officials together with law enforcement practitioners who have knowledge of and responsibilities for prison operations. To reduce the political anxiety associated with public sector officials commenting on controversial topics, all surveys were coded to protect the identity of the respondent and their agency.

The target audience was contacted via mass email with an invitation letter and asked to access the survey via a commercial website. SPSS software was used to conduct a descriptive and inferential statistical analysis of the responses to identify significant correlations and relationships.

B.   SURVEY DATA COLLECTION

To effectively access a statistically relevant audience, the American Correctional Association and the North American Association of Wardens and Superintendents agreed to assist in the study by encouraging their membership to complete the survey. Recruitment of participants was conducted via e-mail bulletins whereby an invitation e-mail described the purpose and scope of the study and contained a link to the survey. Interested participants could then click the posted link and complete the survey. The survey system then saved participants' responses to a MySQL database that also serves as a data management tool, which aids the researcher in correlating the data and supporting analysis. The survey was active for approximately six weeks.

After data collection was completed, survey responses were exported from the survey system's MySQL database to an Excel file. A program was then written in the SPSS syntax command language to read in the raw Excel file and format it for data analysis. This included converting character responses (e.g. "y" and "n") to numeric responses (e.g. 1 and 0), and adding variable and coding labels.

C.   DATA ANALYSIS

Survey items relating to each of the four research questions are as follows:

1. Items Q3, Q4, Q5, Q10, Q11, Q12, Q13, Q14, and Q15.

2. Items Q6, Q7, Q8, and Q9.

3. Items Q1 and Q2.

4. Items Q16, Q17, Q18, Q19, Q20, and Q21.

Due to the exploratory nature of this small survey, data analyses were confined mostly to descriptive statistics and correlation/regression analyses. Descriptive statistics consisted of means and standard deviations for ratio/interval scale data (Q9, Q22, Q23) and frequencies and proportions (%) for ordinal/nominal scale data.

Inferential statistics consisted of Spearman correlation, as well as Chi-square tests of independence, and logistic regressions. Spearman correlations were used when both variables were ordinal in nature, while the Chi-square test was reserved for analyses, which involved a dichotomous variable or other categorical variable. In cases where the Chi-square tests indicated a significant relationship between a dichotomous variable and ordinal variable(s), logistic regression was used to compute the odds ratios for the dichotomous outcome (e.g. yes/no response). For research questions #1, #2, and #4, these tests were applied as required to explore detailed aspects of each research question.

For research question #3, correlation matrices were generated using the Spearman non-parametric correlation test to examine inter-relationships among ratings of prison gang and extremist group activity in prisons (Q1) and strength of external connections outside prisons (Q2). Because of using multiple correlations, more conservative limits were set on statistical significance for these tests. For a sample size of fifty, and

specifying a power of .80 and confidence level of .95, Cohen[36] shows that a meaningful correlation would be r=.4 or greater. Given that multiple correlations were required to explore the relationships among the different gangs/extremist groups, a further restriction was placed on the significance value (p<.005) to guard against spurious correlations.

Open-ended questions: Q14 and Q15 (pertaining to the receiving of information/ intelligence on extremist activity), and Q18 and Q20 (pertaining to STG education and training needs) were analyzed by generating a list of categories according to the most common themes present, as determined by an objective observer. Individual responses were then coded according to this list.

All statistical analyses were conducted with SPSS for Windows (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, SPSS Inc. Chicago IL).

---

[36] J. Cohen, *Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 2nd ed.* (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988), 252.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. RESULTS

A. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

Forty-nine surveys were completed and submitted. Table 1 gives a general overview of the prisons sampled in this survey. Number of individuals incarcerated ranged between 16 and 14000, having a mean (± SD) of 1656 (± 2395). Numbers of sworn employees ranged between 0 and 3000, with a mean of 283 (± 484), and numbers of non-sworn employees ranged between 0 and 1109, with a mean of 189 (± 269). Although there were no survey respondents from federal prisons, the above data suggest the sample was diverse, ranging from state prisons (n=34) to a smaller number of local/county jails and prisons (n=12), private facilities (n=2) and a detention center (n=1). These latter descriptors were provided by respondents answering the "Other" category.

Table 1 also shows the breakdown of prison population and manpower for state and other facilities. Means and ranges of incarcerated individuals, as well as non-sworn personnel, were similar between these two types of facilities. The mean number of sworn personnel was smaller for state prisons (184 ± 201) compared to other prisons (501 ± 770), but as one might expect with such high variances, an independent samples t-test failed to detect any significant difference (p>.05). It may therefore be concluded that the two prison types sampled in this survey were similar in terms of inmate population size and numbers of personnel.

B. RESULTS

1. Research Question #1:

What gaps exist in intelligence collection and reporting of extremist activities in America's prisons?

Rating of sources of information and intelligence on extremist group activity

Table 2 summarizes the ratings of various sources of information and intelligence on extremist group activity. The most frequent response category for each information/ intelligence source is indicated by the bold text in Table 2. Most responded "Don't

know" to the usefulness of information/ intelligence sources from federal agencies (FBI classified reports: 57%, FBI unclassified reports: 51%; BOP reports: 49%, and Other federal agencies: 39%) and State office of Homeland Security (31%). Of those who reported other than "Don't know" for these sources of information/ intelligence, the most frequent ratings were "Fair" (classified and unclassified FBI reports) to "Good" (BOP, other federal agencies, State office of Homeland Security), as shown by the blue text highlight.

Corrections and law enforcement professional associations were reported most frequently (45% and 35%, respectively) as "Good" sources of information, as was Media (publications/ print)(37%), Internet (31%), Books/academic journals (47%) and Informants (29%). Radical group publications were also reported as being a "Good" source of information by 25% of respondents, but more than 26% reported "Don't know," again suggesting prison officials may have limited access to such materials.

These results suggest that information sources fall into two broadly defined categories among the prisons sampled (all non-federal prisons). Usefulness of federal sources was dominated by the "Don't know" response, and thus may be considered *limited access sources*. More accessible sources (such as media, internet, books/journals, corrections professional associations) may be considered *broad access sources*. Of these, corrections professional associations were rated the best source of information and the media the worst.

Interaction with JTTF regarding extremist group activity

As shown in Table 3, most respondents (49%) reported "Never" having interaction with JTTF, and 40% reported "Seldom" having interaction with JTTF. Only 8% reported "Frequent" interaction and 2% (1 respondent) reported "Very frequent" interaction. Of the 25 who responded other than "Never", thirteen indicated the nature of this interaction. Five (38%) of these indicated this interaction was related to extremist activity.

Table 4 shows the relationship between frequency of interaction of JTTFs (collapsed to "Seldom" and "Frequently" or "Very Frequently") and the nature of the reported activity (extremist activity or not). Although the sample is small (as only 13

participants responded to Q4) the Chi-Square test indicated that more frequent interaction with JTTFs was associated with reporting extremist activity ($x2=9.24$ $p=.002$). A significant correlation (Spearman) was also found between frequency of interaction with JTTFs (non-collapsed), and number of persons assigned to STIUs (Q9) ($r=.351$, $p=.013$). While the small sample does not permit further exploration of the nature of this relationship, it does suggest that a fuller complement of personnel dedicated to STIUs enables more frequent communication with JTTFs.

Handling of information/ intelligence on extremist group activity in prisons

Data in Table 5 describe the internal handling of information/intelligence on extremist group activity in the prisons sampled. Most (49%) indicate that extremist group activity is "Seldom" reported, followed by 35% indicating it is "Frequently" reported. Six percent (3 respondents) indicated "Very frequent" reporting of extremist group activity and 10% (5 respondents) indicated "Never." Of those responding (41 of 49 respondents), "Written report" was the most common method of reporting (46%), followed by "Verbally" (29%) and "Electronically" (24%).

How frequently extremist activity was reported (collapsed to "Never/Seldom" and "Frequently" or "Very Frequently") was significantly related to whether or not the prison has written policies on reporting extremist activity (Q16) ($x2=11.6$, $p=.001$), and to what extent radicalization is covered in their basic certification curriculum (Q17) ($x2=9.1$, $p=.028$). These relationships were positive, indicating that the frequency of reporting is dependent upon the appropriate policies and certification training being in place. Logistic regression showed that prisons with written policies in place related to identifying and reporting extremist activity were 20 times more likely to frequently or very frequently report extremist activity (Odds ratio= 20.4; 95% CI: 2.4-175, $p=.006$), while having adequate coverage of radicalization in the basic certification curriculum were almost 4 times as likely to frequently or very frequently report extremist activity (Odds ratio=3.89; 95% CI:1.44-10.5, $p=.006$). As indicated by the rather broad confidence intervals, the small cell sizes warrant caution when generalizing these data. These results are summarized in Tables 6 and 7.

21

Data in Table 8 describe the external handling of information/intelligence on extremist group activity in the prisons sampled. Thirty-three (67%) of 49 respondents indicated that the information is shared with law enforcement outside the prison. Ten percent indicated the information was not shared externally, and 22% were uncertain. Thirty-four indicated how this information was shared. Responses were relatively evenly distributed over the response categories. Of the thirty-four who responded, method external reporting was 25% "Written report", 25% "Verbally", 21% "Electronically", 18% "Intelligence report" and 9% "Uncertain".

Interestingly, sharing of information with law enforcement was found to have a significant relationship ($x2=18.6$, $p=.001$) with respondents' attitudes regarding the degree to which adequate training is available to address the problem of radicalization. The data in Table 9 suggest that prisons that share information on extremist activity with outside law enforcement are more likely to have adequate training in place (or believe this to be so) for dealing with the problem of radicalization in prisons.

Open-ended questions Q14 and Q15 were reviewed and found to be composed of eight categories or themes, as summarized in Table 10. For question Q14, pertaining to how information is received from other areas of responsibility, forms of communication were somewhat uniformly distributed across verbal, written, electronic, or combinations thereof. Ten percent indicated they receive no information from other areas of responsibility. For question Q15 (also in Table 10), similarly, the forms of receiving intelligence from other prisons were primarily written, electronic or combinations of various forms of media, with less frequent verbal communication. Sixteen percent reported received no information or intelligence from other prisons.

2.   **Research Question #2:**

What role do Security Threat Intelligence Units play in identifying, collecting, and reporting of information and intelligence on prison radicalization?

Security Threat Intelligence Unit (STIU)

Nine of the 49 respondents (18%) were themselves assigned to an STIU. Thirty-seven of 49 (76%) reported their facility as having a dedicated STIU. Job responsibilities

of personnel in these 37 STIU consisted of the following (in order of prevalence): Intelligence gathering (92%), Investigation (81%), Liaison with law enforcement outside prison (73%), Analysis/reporting (70%) and Training other personnel (68%). Only sixteen of the 37 (43%) who reported having a dedicated STIU also reported having increased the number of personnel in the last five years. These data are shown in Table 11.

Numbers of personnel assigned to STIU are shown at the bottom of Table 11. Four respondents did not enter a value for personnel assigned to STIUs, or entered a zero for all four employee types. Also, three respondents indicated a very large (>20, maximum 200) number of assigned personnel (sworn, full-time). The resulting distribution did not lend itself to parametric descriptives (means and standard deviations), therefore, the data were classified according to "Did not respond", "1-4", "5-9", "10-19", and ">20". The majority of respondents (57%) indicated between 1-4 persons assigned to their facilities' STIU.

A note of caution is prudent as some respondents who claimed not to have a dedicated STIU (answered "no" to Q6) entered values in the fields for employee numbers assigned to an STIU. This in combination with the zeros entered for those claiming to have an STIU suggests some participants may not have fully understood the question regarding the number of personnel.

Nevertheless, the existence of a dedicated STIU was found to have a trend toward a significant association with the extent to which radicalization is covered in the basic certification curriculum (Q17) ($x2=3.57$, $p=.059$) and the adequacy of available training (Q19) ($x2=5.50$, $p=.064$). However, when examined with logistic regression, a unit increase in response to Q17 (e.g. from "Somewhat Covered" to "Covered") indicated a 5-fold likelihood that a dedicated STIU was in place (Odds ratio: 5.3; 95% CI: 1.55-18.1, $p=.008$). Similarly, a unit increase in the adequacy of training available (e.g. from "Not Adequate" to "Adequate") indicated more than a 3-fold likelihood that a dedicated STIU was in place (Odds ratio: 3.7; 95% CI: 1.17-11.9, $p=.026$). These results suggest a strong

linkage between the existence between the existence of dedicated STIUs and the degree of training available to address the problem of prison radicalization. These data are summarized in Tables 12 and 13.

3. Research Question #3:

What is the relationship between criminal gangs and radical extremists in prisons?

Level and extent of extremist activity in prisons sampled

Forty-eight of the 49 respondents rated the level of activity of different extremist group types in their prison (Table 14), and rated the corresponding strength of connection to their colleagues outside of prison for these groups (Table 15).

In general, activity levels of extremist groups and gangs were rated mostly "Somewhat active" or "Not present." Prison gangs (such as Bloods, Crips, Latin Kings, etc.) were generally the most active, with 18% reporting "Very Active", 27% reporting "Active" and 45% reporting "Somewhat active." Religious (Muslim, Christian, etc.) and Right-wing (Racists, fascists, Skinheads, KKK, Aryan, etc.) groups followed closely behind with 8% and 6% reporting "Very active, 14% and 14% reporting "Active," and 57% and 43% reporting "Somewhat active," respectively. The majority reported "Not present" for Left-wing (ALF, ELF, Weather Underground, etc.)(82%), Anti-government (67%), and Other (88%) types of extremist groups Other groups (5 in total), rated as "Somewhat active" consisted of local/temporal gangs and Mafia groups (Mafiosi and Mexican).

Table 15 shows that a similar ranking exists for the strength of connection these groups have to their colleagues outside prison, with prison gangs having the strongest external connections, with 27% reporting "Very strong," 20% reporting "Strong," and 37% reporting "Somewhat strong." Religious and Right-wing groups followed again with 8% reporting "Very strong," 14% reporting "Strong," and 47% and 31% reporting "Somewhat strong," respectively. However, 31% and 47% reported "Not present" for an outside connection for Religious and Right-wing groups, respectively. The majority

reported "Not present" for Left-wing groups (84%), Anti-government groups (76%), and Other (94%) groups, consistent with the previous responses regarding group activity levels.

Inter-relationships Among Active Extremist Groups

Data in Tables 16 and 17 show the correlation among responses to the items of question Q1 and Q2, respectively, on the survey. While correlation analysis does not infer cause and effect, it can show where associations exist. Correlations in Table 16 show that religious activity is associated with prison gang activity (r=.458, p=.001) and anti-government group activity (r=.405, p=.004). Associations between strength (or weakness) of activity were also present among the right-wing, left-wing, anti-government, and other groups. Correlations in Table 17 show that strength of connections to extremist groups' colleagues outside of prison is highly correlated among almost all groups. This finding suggests that where mechanisms exist for outside connections, those mechanisms are exploited by all groups.

4.   Research Question #4:

How should prison staff be trained to cope with prison radicalization?

Preparedness for handling extremist group activity in prisons

Thirty-two of the 49 respondents (65%) indicated their prison has written policies related to identifying and reporting extremist group activity (Q17), as shown in Table 18. Responses to whether radicalization was covered in the certification curriculum, also shown in Table 18, indicated it was most frequently "Somewhat covered" (47%), followed by "Not covered" (22%), "Covered" (20%), "Uncertain (6%) and "Well covered" (4%).

Twenty-six of 49 respondents (53%) viewed available training (Q19) to be "Somewhat adequate", followed by "Not adequate" (29%), and "Adequate" (18%). These data are shown in Table 19. The most frequently identified barriers to adequate training were "Lack of local funding" (59%) and "Not high on priority list" (59%), and lesser but still frequently identified were "Training unavailable in area" (35%) and "Lack of federal funding" (29%).

When collapsed to dichotomous variables, and shown in Table 20, a significant relationship was found between responses to survey questions Q17 and Q19 ($x2=12.3$, $p<.001$). This relationship suggests that respondent attitudes about the adequacy of training are significantly linked to radicalization being covered in the basic certification curriculum.

Open-ended questions Q18 and Q20 were reviewed and found to be composed of seven categories or themes, as summarized in Table 21. For question Q18, pertaining to availability of education and training on indicators of radicalization/ extremist group activity, the two most frequent responses (22% each) were "Basic/ in-service training" and "None". Sixteen percent indicated gang awareness/ identification training, while 14% indicated STG training.

For question Q20, pertaining to the types of additional education and training that would be beneficial, the two most frequent responses (20% each) were for the "Don't know" response and the "Current events/trend awareness" response category. This category theme included a number of responses that identified a desire to have access to more up-to-date information on current events and trends. Sixteen percent identified "Radicalization identification/ awareness training" as beneficial. Other response themes consisted of "General education/class room" (14%) and "Info-sharing/inter-agency communication" (14%), and "Intelligence gathering/analysis" (8%).

IV. INTERVIEWS

Although the survey answered a number of questions about prison radicalization, it also raised a few points that merit further investigation to gain a more in-depth understanding of the problem. Responses, comments and analysis of the survey revealed the three key subjects of intelligence, training, and the relationships between gangs and extremists as having important relationships that influence radicalization in prisons. To gain a better understanding of the dynamics that affect the relationships in each of these areas, representatives with special insight into these topics were solicited for personal interview. Initial requests for interview were made by email where the nature of the inquiry was disclosed and that the interview would be for attribution. Each of the interviewees was selected for their expertise in the topic areas and also to provide a balanced opinion that represented the federal, state and local points of view. The interviews were guided by a standard set of questions, but because of their special insight to different areas that affect prison radicalization the flow and direction of the interviews were unique to each individual, which led the discussion in divergent directions. The interviewees included Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security at The George Washington University; Executive Director Arthur A. Leonardo of the North American Association of Wardens and Superintendents (NAAWS), and Lieutenant John P. Sullivan from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.

Prior to joining The George Washington University, Frank J. Cilluffo served as Special Assistant to President George W. Bush and principal advisor to DHS Secretary Tom Ridge as he directed the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council. He has testified before the United States Congress on several occasions, including September 2006 on prison radicalization. In his opinion, the culture and group behavior in networked organizations like gangs and terror groups offers charismatic personalities in prisons a chance to cull vulnerable inmates into a radical ideology through social bonding. Prisons have always been incubators for radical ideas where charismatic personalities such as Adolf Hitler create disquisitions like *Mein Kampf*, which are meant to influence followers toward a radical ideology by creating a strong social connection

with a disenfranchised audience. While he agrees that profiling terrorists is not a productive endeavor, Mr. Cilluffo cites this creation of social bonds as a common factor that links the culture of gangs with terrorist groups and one that presents a challenge for homeland security leaders to understand.

This influence that individual charismatic leaders have is a trend that he thinks is an indicator of what makes prison radicalization a unique homeland security problem. Much like a criminal prison gang, which is characterized by a relatively flat organizational structure where leaders are chosen based on their influence, the followers of Sunni Islam do not have a central authoritative religious figure equivalent to the Ayatollah with Shi'a Muslims or the Pontiff in the Catholic faith. Mr. Cilluffo points out that this allows individual charismatic leaders to have an effect on how their radical message can be shaped. This is where homeland security leaders have to be critical thinkers in understanding that part of the solution will likely have to come from outside the law enforcement discipline. He suggests that we will have to enlist those that can use their knowledge of the Qur'an to support an anti-extremist message against fundamentalists that are interpreting scripture in a radical way.

Mr. Cilluffo thinks that people have not stepped back to look at the contours of what prison radicalization is and what it is not, therefore we need to move beyond the anecdotal evidence to get people to pay attention to the problem. He acknowledges that there is not an abundance of research available on the subject and points out that what is available is not always accessible to practitioners in corrections and law enforcement. This can be attributed to the complexities of radicalization in general, the sensitivities of associating the effects of religion and terrorism, and the operational realities that have an effect on prisons in general. Mr. Cilluffo recognizes that managing an institution that is saturated with the worst that society has to offer is a full time job for any warden. It is difficult to add yet another priority on an already overburdened prison administration that has their hands full just trying to keep prisoners from breaking out.

One area where Mr. Cilluffo suggests more research needs to be conducted is in understanding the processes of how someone goes from sympathizer to activist to an agent of violence. He suggests that understanding how networked organizations form,

operate, and how they break down from an anthropological perspective may give us an indication of how we can create strategies to counter extremists. For example, he noted that law enforcement developed informants from within the Cosa Nostra organization to instill a loss of confidence and trust that began to break the organization down after the rise to prominence that follow the prohibition era. Although officials failed to completely remove the organization, their understanding of the importance of trust within their leadership helped to reduce the threat and keep the proliferation under control. Cilluffo also suggested that the organized crime model may be more effective against prison radicalization than the conventional counterterrorism model.

When it comes to intelligence Mr. Cilluffo believes that misunderstandings at all levels of government prevent information from being shared. He makes the point that officials cannot look at intelligence in the microcosms of prisons alone because the problem goes much deeper. State and local agencies have to get more involved in requirements to determine what the needs are while many at the federal level are mistaken that the information will come from the top-down when in reality it comes from the bottom-up. He suggests that security clearances are not the answer as some have proposed as being a solution to obtaining information and intelligence, but instead it is getting sensitive information into a usable format to deliver an actionable product. There is also a misperception that an abundance of intelligence exists that is not being shared by federal agencies which is not always the case. Mr. Cilluffo believes that corrections at the state and federal levels must get more involved in information sharing, but also thinks this push should come from within instead of externally.

Finally, Mr. Cilluffo thinks the experiences that the United Kingdom and France have with radicalization within prisons can be a valuable source of education for the United States. Globalization facilitated through the Internet makes the threat transnational so what happens in one country may have implications in another so we should pay attention to it. He concludes that radicalization is a problem not limited to the confines of prison walls and we need to not only fight the structure alone, but also learn to understand why the extremist message resonates with people so we can also attack their strategy.

Arthur A. Leonardo has been the Executive Director of the North American Association of Wardens and Superintendents since 1995 and is a retired warden in the New York state correctional system. He also served as the Deputy Commissioner of Operations for five years where he gained valuable insight to the development of Islamic extremist influence in prisons. Mr. Leonardo believes that prisons are a good place to recruit terrorists because there are a lot of disaffected people who do not feel like they belong to anything and can be easily led. He related a historical perspective of the proliferation that New York State experienced in the 1970s and 1980s where Muslims in prisons were fighting each other. It was in the 1980s that foreign Muslims began to appear in U.S. prisons and most of those were of Eastern European descent with a few having an organized crime connection. Early on, prison officials did not recognize the difference between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims and considered the Muslim movement to be simply another gang. In his opinion, this lack of Islamic cultural awareness and historical perspective is a problem that still affects the correctional system and should be a focus of training for officers. Mr. Leonardo suggested a national training academy or exchange programs with other countries as ways to soften the primary barriers of funding and few qualified trainers, which put a strain on state and local agencies.

When it comes to the interaction between gangs and extremists in prisons Mr. Leonardo believes their associations are almost exclusively involved in trying to further criminal activity. He related a story about the time immediately following the 9/11 attacks in New York prisons where anyone that appeared to be an Islamic extremist had to be low key or face attacks because the other inmates felt a strong sense of patriotism. Although he thinks that most inmates would not knowingly participate in terrorist actions against the U.S., Mr. Leonardo acknowledges the possibility that gangs or lone wolves may be susceptible to commit terror acts on a "for hire" basis.

Mr. Leonardo supports the concept of STIUs as an effective strategy for monitoring, reporting and countering extremists in prisons. Their experience with gangs makes these units the logical choice as the primary resource to coordinate the effort, however he cautions that we already have much of the information we need to connect the dots but do not do a good job of communicating or sharing it well. In his opinion, the

information and intelligence sharing problem is more of a leadership issue than a technical or cultural limitation. Instead of pointing out poor examples he cited a strong model that he is familiar with that begins with good working relationships between the New York Department of Corrections, State Police, and the NYPD Anti-Terrorism Bureau created through formal and informal relationships. Leaders of each component have set aside their cultural biases long enough to share important information in an effort to make one of the prime targets for terrorism a better prepared.

One topic of discussion unique to Mr. Leonardo involved the possibility of using volunteers to perform tasks in prisons that would allow full time personnel to concentrate their efforts to reduce radicalization to operational functions. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks he wrote a letter suggesting that thousands of retired officers were looking for things to do that would help New York cope with security concerns related to terrorism and that the Department of Corrections should consider taking advantage of a potentially valuable resource to augment existing personnel. Although he never received an answer to his request, Mr. Leonardo still thinks existing volunteer programs in prisons could be expanded to take advantage of the breadth in experience that retirees have, many of which still want to contribute on a limited basis.

Lieutenant John P. Sullivan serves as Director of the National Terrorism Early Warning Resource Center and is co-founder of the Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group. A senior research fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism, he has managed intelligence and terrorism response activities as well as being a noted author on gangs and terrorism. When discussing the connections between criminal gangs and extremists identified in the survey responses, Lieutenant Sullivan points out that when gangs or terrorist groups use violence it is instrumental and meant to send a message to a particular audience. In the case of terrorist groups that message is often directed within the group to form cohesion or to mobilize people to a common purpose. For terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda Sullivan believes that the U.S. general public is the secondary audience, while their primary audience is their own

constituency that they seek to influence and use against us hoping that we will change our policies. Ultimately this results in the terrorist group gaining more power and perpetuates the life of the organization.

Despite the fact that prison radicalization is an evolving phenomenon, Lieutenant Sullivan believes that we can learn from other countries that are experiencing far greater problems with radicalization in prisons. He noted that we still do not have a clear picture of the problem in the United Kingdom and France with Islamist extremists influencing other inmates, but it may benefit agencies in the U.S. to draw upon their experiences to increase our opportunities for training. Another subject that he suggested to be addressed is training on the dynamics of small group violence, particularly the social psychology of how these groups come together and how they emerge. Sullivan recommends taking advantage of training offered by the Israelis who are particularly effective at producing good intelligence products on extremists in and out of prison.

Sullivan thinks that moderate Imams could be a valuable resource in prisons if they are properly integrated into the chaplaincy corps. This begins with establishing a good dialogue with local Imams and engaging them through mutual training and education. The Imams can help inmates and corrections staff understand Islam and its cultural practices while corrections personnel can train the Imams in prison policies and procedures so they understand the security concerns that impact the inmate's daily life. Sullivan believes that this collaboration between Imams and correctional security is vital.

Like Mr. Leonardo, Lieutenant Sullivan's opinion is that the most common threat comes from the alliances that form between networked groups like gangs and extremists. In prison, inmates are exceptionally vulnerable, which makes them susceptible to recruitment into gangs or by extremist groups. He cautions that while the likelihood of homegrown terrorist collaboration is limited to material support through criminal enterprise, we do not know enough about the problem to discount the threat of a lone wolf buying into the radical ideology and participating in actual attacks.

When asked about information sharing, Sullivan points out that what we are doing in intelligence is usually tactical rather than strategic intelligence. He does not discount

the value of tactical intelligence, but thinks there is more value in strategic intelligence to identify trends and patterns. Many times the barriers to information sharing are ineffective communication skills and the lack of established relationships. In discussion with the author it was determined that this represents more of a leadership issue than a technical or resource barrier.

Sullivan is a proponent of building the informal relationships between agencies in order for the formal relationships to work effectively. He opined that administrators can mandate collection and reporting through written directives, but the way to make it effective and keep it going is by nurturing the informal relationships that cause people to want to share the information. Part of the problem can be attributed to bureaucratic competition between agencies and part of the problem is that we do not spend enough time in face-to-face conversation. He believes that intelligence reports are good, but there is no substitute for his monthly intelligence meetings where personal interaction often leads to connecting the dots between similar cases. Face-to-face interaction builds trust and leads to breaking down the cultural barriers that block information sharing.

When asked about the best strategy to address prison radicalization, Sullivan recommended forming task forces of street gang officers, terrorism investigators, prison STIU personnel, and intelligence officers to conduct strategic intelligence endeavors. He acknowledged that creating such a task force would be the best-case scenario, but emphasized that the important aspect remains with developing the informal relationships between agencies.

Finally, Lieutenant Sullivan believes that there is not a wealth of information on understanding radicalization and that the interest in the threat is just emerging. We need more significant research on the problem to develop training for the line officer inside prisons. Once effective training programs are created, mobile training teams could be developed to expose all prisons to the instruction. Ideally, he thinks that this should be accomplished at the federal level, but the initiative will likely be done at the state or local levels because we cannot wait until the next attack happens to make the necessary changes.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V.   ANALYSIS

Government and academic research on radicalization is mostly directed to why individuals and groups connect with terrorists, but little effort is being focused on the more important issue of how those connections are made in order to understand the problem. In particular, concentrating on trying to identify a psychological profile of what makes people vulnerable to terrorist recruitment has not met with much success. There is a tendency on the part of laypersons and media analysts to apply the psychological profiling techniques used successfully in deductive and inductive criminal investigative assessments of criminal behavior to terrorists based on the heinous nature of their acts. The fallacy of this approach is that situational factors have more influence than the psychopathology of individual actors and trying to forensically dissect the mind of the terrorist personality in general is of little value in all but a few notable examples.[37] Instead of trying to develop profiles of terrorists or dissecting the psychopathology of the typical radicalized individual, some experts suggest that understanding social networks is a more productive predictor of terrorist behavior.[38] Prisons provide an ideal setting for group interaction with extremists that seek to radicalize the population for support of terrorist operations.

Jose Padilla, Levar Haley Washington, and Jeff Fort are documented examples of homegrown terrorists that began their path to radicalization while in prison, which led to their participation in material support of domestic terrorism. While the framework of the groups associated with these individuals is not on the level of al Qaeda, Hamas, or Aum Shinrikyo, the early warning signs of an organized effort for prison radicalization that presents a risk for terrorist attacks against the United States cannot be ignored. The common denominator in each of these cases is their strong connections to criminal and

---

[37] James N. Breckenridge and Philip G. Zimbardo, "The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of Mass-Mediated Fear," in *Psychology of Terrorism*, eds. Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge, & Philip G. Zimbardo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 126-127.

[38] Randy Borum, *Psychology of Terrorism*, (Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 2004), 38; Gregory B. Saathoff, *Testimony of Gregory B. Saathoff before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate*, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, September 19, 2006, 7, at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/091906Saathoff.pdf (Accessed June 5, 2007).

prison gangs. The strong external support structure associated with prison gangs and extremists that was revealed in the survey and supported in the interviews show that their similar organizational values and norms may appeal to inmates who are vulnerable to group influence and a need to be accepted.

In describing terrorist networks, Sageman depicts the structure of the links and nodes of small world networks that characterize modern day terrorist groups as a social network, which is eerily similar to the structure of criminal gangs in the United States.[39] Both believe that their group actions are acceptable behavior for correcting perceived injustices and that the ends justify the means when using violence since theirs is a righteous cause. A sustained motivation to participate in activities that support terrorism requires regular reinforcement of group dynamics and prison provides an ideal setting since most inmates are incarcerated for more than a year.[40] The issue for homeland security leaders to consider is "whether [these] group dynamics are sufficient in and of themselves to turn an average person into a terrorist or whether individual history and personality must be considered as well."[41]

Although there is considerable evidence to support the contention that the vast majority of terrorists do not suffer from a diagnosable mental illness, there is little research on the associations of terrorists with inmates that may exhibit signs of criminal psychopathologies. In the Middle East where terrorist groups are prolific, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other well known terrorist groups make efforts to weed out psychopaths and sociopaths in the recruiting process since they will often be difficult to control.[42] This disassociation is made possible partly because their principal means of support comes

---

[39] Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terrorist Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 137-140.

[40] Rex A. Hudson, *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* (Washington, D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September 1999), 24-25.

[41] Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 1 (February 2005): 30.

[42] Andrea Kohn Maikovich, "A New Understanding of Terrorism Using Cognitive Dissonance Principles," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 35, no. 4 (2005): 374-375; Hudson, *Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism,* 31-32.

from charitable organizations and not from criminal enterprise. This limits, but does not eliminate, the need for regular contact with the criminal element for primary financial support operations.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, we see the insurgency closely aligned with the black market and criminal enterprise.[43] The bar seems to be set lower in this situation as the need for multiple attacks outweigh the other operational and mission security concerns. In other parts of the world the lines between criminality and terrorism become blurred even further when militant Islamist separatist groups like Abu Sayyaf focus on kidnappings and extortion as a means of coercion more so than conventional attacks designed to inflict mass casualties. The circumstances in the U.S. are more closely related to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict where the volume of attacks is inferior to the need for mission security. Including the criminal element into the strategic or mission planning phases subjects operational security to increased risks of detection. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the role of prison radicalization lies more in support operations than directly engaging in attacks. Comments from Sullivan and Leonardo corroborate this point of view and they caution that we should not underestimate the link between crime and international terrorism.[44] The ability of a criminal gang to generate money through drug sales, property crimes, fraud, counterfeiting, and robbery has more appeal in the U.S. where the criminal justice system is overloaded with cases and usually willing to consider plea bargains for those apprehended in all but the most egregious cases. This dynamic increases exponentially for juvenile offenders. Although the interviewees agree that material support of terrorist activities is the greatest risk, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a lone wolf recruit similar to a Richard Reid or Jose Padilla being selected for a specific operational mission.

---

[43] Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrance K. Kelley, David Brannan, & Keith Crane, *Developing Iraq's Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience*, Monograph MG-365 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 45; Seth G. Jones, "Afghan Problem is Regional," *United Press International*, (Washington, D.C., July 4, 2007), at http://www.upi.com/Security_Terrorism/Analysis/2007/07/04/outside_view_afghan_problem_is_regional/5507/ (Accessed July, 25, 2007).

[44] John P. Sullivan, interview by the author, June, 8, 2007; Arthur A. Leonardo, interview by the author, June 29, 2007.

A distinction must be made in the case of homegrown terrorists since the cultures, socioeconomic conditions, and degree of freedoms are vastly different in Western societies than in the Middle East. The cultural differences carry over to the prison environment where living conditions in general are better in U.S. institutions. While there are cases of notable homegrown terror perpetrators that suffer from mental illness, such as Ted Kaczynski, Eric Harris, and Cho Seung-Hui, the narrow focus of this research to radicalization within correctional institutions has not produced empirical data that associates mental illness with the genesis of terrorist behavior. The case of Washington falls into the category of a rational actor that made a conscious choice to take calculated risks in pursuit of the group's desired objectives. No single behavioral theory by itself will explain the homegrown terrorist's motivations and it is more likely that a combination of sociological and psychological conditions make an inmate that is predisposed to commit violent acts to be vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.

Much of the available literature points to international terrorists being from middle class to affluent families, educated, and successful.[45] However, the potential pool of recruits in the U.S. who meet this description will more often be found at undergraduate institutions of higher education rather than from the correctional system. It is far more likely that the socioeconomic position of the prison radicalized convert will be from a disadvantaged, frustrated, and uneducated demographic. Their experiences with the real or perceived injustices of society make them vulnerable to charismatic leaders that offer a means to resolve their anger in a meaningful way.[46] This is supported by Victorff who contends that "identity-starved joiners are also hypothesized to be motivated by a desire to embrace the intimate tutelage of a charismatic leader."[47] When the charismatic influence is a respected inmate acting as a religious scholar or a radical Imam brought in from outside the prison, inmates searching for value and purpose in

---

[45] Angela Gendron, "Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment," *Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs,* Carleton University Volume 2006-4 (March 2007): 8, at http://www.carleton.ca/cciss/res_docs/itac/gendron_e.pdf (Accessed June 11, 2007).

[46] Fathali M. Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 86-88.

[47] Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," 23.

their lives will be indoctrinated to an extremist ideology that is distorted through religion.[48] It is this charismatic influence that concerns Cilluffo who noted that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was not much more than a street thug before his prison term provided him the opportunity to become one of the most charismatic figures in al Qaeda in Iraq.[49]

Sullivan mentioned the importance of collaboration between the prison chaplaincy service and correctional security to provide inmates with access to moderate Imams.[50] In the UK, prison officials are trying to recruit "homegrown Imams to minister to the needs of their Muslim inmates, rather than relying on foreign Imams whom they claim are often unfamiliar with the West of beholden with foreign interests."[51] Officials in Her Majesty's Prison Service have appointed a full-time Muslim Advisor to administer the Islamic religious services program and since 2001 his efforts have resulted in the addition of 23 full-time Muslim chaplains.[52] By seeing the same Imams over a period of time a rapport can be established that provides a sense of stability as converts learn the teachings of Islam. To date, the BOP has still not adequately improved their procedures as it relates to recruitment and screening of religious contractors and volunteers. This leaves a void for inmates that see themselves as surrogate Imams to seize an opportunity for espousing radical messages in the name of religion.

In the previous chapter Cilluffo suggests that moderate Muslims should be involved in supporting the anti-extremist message to counter the radical influence, yet employing such a strategy must be done with great care. "Implementing a Muslim prison ministry program with western rationality and biases can result in increased number of

---

[48] Hudson, *Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism*, 43.

[49] Frank J. Cilluffo, interview by the author, July 10, 2007.

[50] Sullivan, interview with the author.

[51] Roy Walmsey, *World Prison Population List, Fifth Ed.* (London: Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Home Office, 2004), 5, at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r234.pdf (Accessed March 12, 2007).

[52] James A. Beckford, "Muslims in the Prisons of Britain and France," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 13, no.3, (2005): 291.

terrorists and terrorist supporters."[53] The perception that prison Imams are agents of the U.S. government or implementing an impure form of Islam will have just as much of a negative effect in countering the radical influence as perpetuating the current void of inadequate Islamic religious services.

According to the FBI, "the situations that place converts in a position to be influenced by Islamic extremists appear to be more important than the convert's initial motivations for converting."[54] During the beginning stages of radicalization the inmate is introduced to new ideas and people who will influence his conversion through intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.[55] Inmates who have experienced a lifetime of abuse and neglect creating a void in their lives are presented with the extremist group which seeks to replace a void with a supportive social network that not only offers protection and moral direction within the prison, but external support upon release. In the case of prison convert,s it is those interactions and changes in behavior that will lead the trained observer to identify inmates that are beginning to build their new extremist identity.

It may be more difficult to identify group associations where individuals or criminal prison gangs clandestinely provide material support for terrorist operations. In some cases the gang hierarchy may be unaware that their criminal enterprise with an extremist group is funding terrorism activities and in other cases their need to strengthen money-making opportunities outweighs their sense of patriotism. These alliances and associations are desirable for "radical Islamist groups because of their ability to operate freely in Europe, Asia and North America without arousing the suspicion of security authorities."[56]

In the cases of Washington and Fort we see that their gang involvement led to associations with terrorism, but the motivation for the charismatic terrorist leader that

---

[53] James K. Dooghan, "Muslim Prison Ministry: Hindering the Spread of the Radical, Militant, Violent and Irreconcilable Wing of Islam," *School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College*,(Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2006), 49, at https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dtic/nps23-01230701.pdf&code=5a1eaf8553d0475bebbed17ee94e713f (Accessed July 28, 2007).

[54] U.S. DOJ, FBI Counterterrorism Division, *Radicalization Process*, 4. FOUO.

[55] Ibid, 5.

[56] Gendron, "Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment," 13.

influenced them was material support for future domestic operations in the United States. When it comes to 2nd and 3rd generation gangs, Sullivan believes we may start to see these gangs and cartels work together for mutual benefits and that may lead to the development of shared political philosophies:

> What we are seeing are tactical alliances and alliances of convenience where the criminal gang doesn't embrace the overarching ideology. They just do it because they want to make money and this is the most common situation. The more dangerous prospect is that the criminal group will buy the extreme ideology and graft it onto their own organization. We haven't seen that yet, but that is the potential.[57]

For prison radicalization to be recognized as a homeland security threat that transcends the corrections discipline there needs to be a fundamental shift in the perception that incarceration interrupts a terrorist group's ability to influence activities outside prison walls. One of the common themes throughout the survey and interviews focused on the need for better communication between agencies and especially across different levels of government. Intra-agency communication appears to be better in full service agencies like the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department where officers that are assigned to the jail, patrol, and investigations all work for the same agency. Although there are still barriers to communication, mid and upper level management that have been assigned to several different areas of the agency throughout their careers are better prepared to mitigate the barriers through informal relationships built over many years. Being able to link jail intelligence with outside intelligence will help us to understand the associations by identifying who is visiting radicals and then developing connections through conspiracy investigations.

One of the recommendations in the Inspector General's report to the BOP proposed closer monitoring of all religious activities within prisons, but only after instituting a training program to prepare correctional officers to recognize the signs of radicalization.[58] In the previous chapter it was also suggested that taking advantage of training available in other countries to draw upon their experience and expertise may help

---

[57] Sullivan, interview with the author.

[58] U.S. DOJ, OIG, 49.

our domestic intelligence efforts. The importance of training and education cannot be overstated, but it is imperative to remember that constitutional protections do not stop at prison gates and much of what other countries carry out at the practitioner level is untenable in the United States. Training and education must go beyond tactical and operational subjects to include legal constraints, cultural norms and mores, and high liability issues.

In addition to the examples provided by the interviewees in the previous chapter, the author has experience with an organized network of multi-agency, multi-discipline task forces to address homeland security issues. The State of Florida is divided into seven regional domestic security task forces that collect, report and share timely information and intelligence to assist public safety leaders in their prevention and preparedness efforts. During significant events, resources are distributed to the affected areas to support Incident Commanders at all levels and share equipment that would otherwise be unavailable to smaller agencies. The Department of Corrections is a member of these domestic security task forces and occasionally supports response operations throughout the state. The challenge for senior corrections administrators will be to increase the department's participation in information and intelligence sharing activities by committing dedicated resources to state fusion centers to coordinate the flow of information to and from STIUs in prisons.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout the surveys and interviews there were recurring themes that can best be summarized as a mixture of frustration and need. Many of the responses related stories of supervisors and administrators frustrated by people in leadership positions that were unwilling to recognize the issue – highlighted in the literature, survey, and through interviews with experts – and take action. One particular survey respondent stated that his fear is that prisons were becoming fertile recruiting grounds for violent and treacherous groups, but the perception is that administration's response is more concerned with the political ramifications of admitting that a problem exists. This concern is echoed by several of his colleagues in the survey who commented that external pressures on administration prevents any progress being made for fear that negative exposure attached to their prison would result in career suicide.

The author experienced this first-hand when trying to secure participation in the survey and interviews. Some of this can be attributed to an inherent lack of trust in law enforcement and corrections cultures, but there was a distinct sense of trepidation in nearly every communication about the political ramifications of speaking out on the sensitive topic of prison radicalization. Despite multiple emails and telephone calls most people in positions of senior leadership did not respond at all and nearly all that did respond found reasons not to contribute. The few brave souls that agreed to lend their experience and expertise to the research were either not affected by organizational politics or felt the threat to our homeland security was significant enough to warrant the risks.

An important opportunity exists to create dialogue on an emerging threat to our national security. This thesis has shown that officials at the federal, state and local levels recognize radicalization in prisons as a problem worth exploring to determine the extent of the risk and how to develop effective responses to counter the threat. Initiating open discussion is the first step toward understanding the threat and it should not result in embarrassment, but rather a deeper awareness of the influences in prisons so we can increase our prevention and response efforts.

The job of senior leadership officials is not to design the countermeasures for prison radicalization, but to acknowledge that the problem exists and initiate change by empowering stakeholders to work toward strategic goals and letting them create the framework that will ensure success. The research has produced findings that suggest initiating transformational change in particular areas may have a greater opportunity for success than in others, however leaders must understand that there will be setbacks and accept error as part of the growing process.

As a result of the findings the following recommendations are offered as options for corrections to increase preparedness, collaboration, and awareness of the threat:

- Establish small, networked units within prisons, such as Security Threat Intelligence Units (STIU), that will identify and report extremist activity that occurs in prisons. These units can act as the information and intelligence conduit for extremist and gang information to the regional and state level, coordinate intervention activities within individual prisons, and serve as the liaison between prisons and agencies that conduct homeland security or criminal investigations.

- Close the gap on information sharing by assigning a senior corrections employee to the state fusion center to be the intelligence liaison for the Department of Corrections. This recommendation is a win-win proposal as corrections will become a full partner in homeland security and be both a provider and consumer of intelligence. Law enforcement will add a source of valuable information that will result in leads being developed for conspiracy investigations and identifying extremists outside of prisons that are exerting radical influence in the community.

- Multiply the value of existing resources by integrating the chaplaincy service with STIUs to identify radical influences within organizations that provide faith-based services to inmates. Leaders within the chaplaincy service can be motivated to seek out moderate Imams within local communities to volunteer for prison ministry as a way of fulfilling the *zakah* or *sadaqah*. The value innovation of this recommendation is incorporating this existing resource in a

proactive program to not only be a source of information, but also a counter-radicalization tool that will provide alternatives to Prislam and extremist rhetoric.

- Recruit volunteers to assist in non-sensitive positions that will free existing employees to concentrate on key functions that identify or interrupt radicalization activities. Retired employees often become bored after some time has passed and long to experience the camaraderie they felt as part of the organization. Their expertise can be useful for as little as a few hours to as much as a few days per week. This is another win-win proposal.

- Supplement domestic training classes with exchange programs that immerse key corrections personnel with their counterparts in foreign prisons to learn how to recognize the signs of radicalization and the countermeasures used to prevent it. Many state and local agencies are already doing this on the law enforcement side of public safety so corrections can draw upon their experiences to establish the right connections to get started. While this is an effort that should ideally be initiated at the federal level, state governments may be forced to act on their own in order to make progress in this area.

These recommendations make use of the same networked philosophy that gangs and terrorist groups use to create the homeland security threat against us. Although the recommendations are the product of research and experience, there will still be significant organizational barriers that must be addressed to make the efforts successful. Some of the barriers will be cultural biases created by perception gaps while others involve cognitive or resource hurdles that require thoughtful analysis and innovation to be prepared for those that resist transformational change.

While "transformations should entail fundamental changes that stretch an organization,"[59] the failure to recognize the internal and external barriers to change will cause most initiatives to fail. Change can be especially difficult in government because it

---

[59] Harold L. Sirkin, Perry Keenan & Alan Jackson, "The Hard Side of Change Management," in *The Harvard Business Review on Leading Through Change* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, 2006), 162.

challenges tenured members that are devoted to process by taking them out of their comfort zone. To get beyond these cognitive hurdles requires tipping point leadership with a clear vision and a support network in place that is not only motivated to influence change, but capable to see the transformation through to completion.

It is not logistically or operationally feasible to have a unit of investigators and analysts dedicated to prison radicalization in every correctional facility in the country. Recognizing that the threat is greatest in large urban areas where extremist activities can be masked in the sea of large prison populations, resources should be concentrated in medium to large metropolitan areas that are known to have gang problems. These facilities should act as regional hubs to provide training and direction for secondary prisons that cannot afford to staff STIUs or send personnel to foreign countries for training, but still need the skills to recognize the signs of radicalization and how to report it.

It is vitally important that the goals and objectives of implementing these recommendations are clear and communicated throughout the respective organizations. Multiple goals that encourage bureaucracy and stifle innovation will result in a "one size fits all" initiative that will not work in every region. Leaders must acknowledge that what works in Los Angeles may not necessarily yield the same results in Chicago or Miami so it is important that individual states tailor their own programs to meet their needs. This will be especially difficult in large bureaucracies like state and federal government where the political climate favors standardization and conformity. To dismiss the political hurdles as simply naysayers committed to the status quo is a tactical error that can kill any strategic plan. Support from key political allies in corrections, law enforcement, homeland security, and the legislature is essential to sustaining the effort.

There are also legitimate resource hurdles to jump when instituting organizational change in bureaucracies and leaders should prepare in advance for challenges from individuals or organizations that will resist transformational growth. For example, unions may oppose volunteers performing essential functions that paid employees could be

doing for overtime. Tipping point leaders will recognize these hurdles before they become an issue and work with key players both in the organization and union to resolve any concerns.

Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research

Many authors of the existing research on prison radicalization note that the threat is still evolving and that not enough study has been completed to assess the full impact of the problem. The need for such studies is particularly evident based on the number of documented cases of recent terror plots uncovered or interrupted that have direct connections to suspects influenced to a radical ideology while in prison. Further research could be conducted to determine what behaviors, if any, are associated with known terrorists converted to a radical ideology in prison and what actions they took upon release that caused them to continue their cycle of radicalization.

The most significant limitation of this research was that participation in the survey was limited to a relatively small number of practitioners. There is a distinct possibility that a larger number of responses would yield different data, but the reasons for limited participation are not likely to change unless the political ramifications of speaking out are diminished and people in senior positions of management publicly acknowledge the problem.

Another deficiency in this research is that the author was not able to interview or survey extremists, prison gang members, or terrorists to account for their perceptions and opinions. There may be a segment of the homeland security community and academia that questions the relevance of such data, but until we understand all of the dynamics that influence radicalization we must not allow our own biases to misinterpret the problem. Further research should include direct communication with these groups because "whatever understanding and sensitivity can be developed by absorbing the anthropological literature mentioned above, there is simply no substitute for firsthand experience of, and dialogue with, members of the cultural group under consideration."[60]

---

[60] David W. Brannan, Philip F. Esler, & N.T. Anders Strindberg, "Talking to 'Terrorists': Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24, no. 1 (January 2001): 16.

Additional research in foreign countries that experience a higher threat for prison radicalization will add to the understanding and significance of the problem, plus encourage collaboration and communication between the United States and our allies in the fight against terrorism.

It is not the intent of this research to determine the degree of risk of terrorist groups to use violence as a tool of influence; rather it assumes that extremists are already in the strategic planning phase and seeking means of support to carry out attacks against the United States. As we harden our critical infrastructure and limit access to the tools that terrorists have used against us in the past, it is logical to assume that the enemy will find new capabilities to attack us using what we least expect to keep our defenses off balance. Our response is to proactively address vulnerabilities beyond simply hardening potential targets and reducing prison radicalization is one way to limit the pool of recruits for terrorist operations. The question is will the U.S. take the appropriate action in response to the advance warning of the threat to avoid what could be considered the next strategic surprise in the terrorist arsenal?

APPENDIX A: SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Acronyms and Definitions used in this Survey

BOP – Federal Bureau of Prisons
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation
JTTF – FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces

For the purposes of this survey the term "radicalization" is defined by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) as "the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes." The term "extremist" is defined as inmates with radical ideologies who use racial, religious, political, or cultural beliefs to recruit and propagate criminal activity internal or external to the prison. Extremist groups may include, but are not limited to: prison gangs, right-wing, left-wing, anti-government, racist, religious, anarchist, environmental, or animal rights groups.

1. Which of these extremist groups are active in your prison?

Group	(Yes)	(No)
Prison gangs (Bloods, Crips, Latin Kings, etc.)		
Religious (Muslim, Christian, etc.)		
Right-wing (Racists, fascists, Skinheads, KKK, Aryan Nation, etc.)		
Left-wing (ELF, ALF, Weather Underground, etc.)		
Anti-government		
Other (Please specify)		

2. The following is a list of possible sources of information and intelligence pertaining to extremist activity in prisons. How useful have you found these resources to be? (Mark one box for each source)

Source	(Never used)	(Not very useful)	(Somewhat useful)	(Very useful)	(Used regularly)
FBI classified reports					
FBI unclassified reports					
Federal BOP reports					
Other federal agency reports					
Your state office of Homeland Security					
Corrections professional associations					
Law enforcement professional associations					
Media (electronic or print)					
Internet					
Books, academic journals, periodicals					
Radical group publications					

Informants
Other (please specify)

3. The FBI is the lead federal law enforcement agency against domestic terrorism and has formed JTTFs to maximize interagency cooperation and coordination to address terrorism problems in the United States. How often does your agency interact with JTTF personnel? (If never skip to question 5)

(Never) (Occasionally) (Regularly)

4. Did this interaction relate to extremist activity in prisons?

(Yes) (No)

5. Does your prison have a dedicated unit, section, group, or individual specifically assigned to identify, track, and/or report radicalization or extremist activity?

(Yes) (No)

6. Which of the following responsibilities depict the duties of this unit, section, group, or individual as it relates specifically to radicalization/extremist activities? (Check all that apply)

Investigation
Intelligence collection
Analysis and reporting of information/intelligence
Training other personnel
Liaison with law enforcement agencies external to the prison
Other (please specify)

7. Within the past five years, has your prison increased the number of personnel specifically assigned to security threat units (STIU) for the purpose of identifying and reporting extremist activity?

(Yes) (No)

8. If you answered yes to question #7, how many personnel are assigned to security threat units (STIU)?

Sworn full-time _____
Sworn part-time _____
Non-sworn full-time ____
Non-sworn part-time ____

9. Do you report extremist activity that occurs within your area of responsibility?

(Yes) (No)

10. If you answered yes to question #9, how do you report it? (Select the most frequently used method)

Verbally
Written report
Electronically
Other (please describe)

11. Is this information shared with law enforcement or corrections officials outside of your prison?

(Yes) (No) (Don't know)

12. If you answered yes to question #11, how is it shared?

Verbally
Written report
Electronically
Intelligence report
Other (please describe)

13. How do you receive information of extremist activity from other areas of responsibility?

14. How do you receive intelligence related to extremist activity from other prisons?

15. Does your prison have written policies related to identifying and reporting of extremist activity?
(Yes) (No)

Training

16. Is radicalization or extremist group training covered in your basic certification curriculum?
(Yes) (No)

17. What type of education and training is available that identifies indicators of radicalization and extremist activity? (Please list)

18. Is the available training adequate to address the problem of radicalization and extremist group activity as you see it?

(Yes) (No)

19. What type of additional education and training would be beneficial?

20. What are the barriers to obtaining more training related to radicalization and extremist group activity? (Check all that apply)

Training is not available in my area
Lack of local funding
Lack of available federal funding
Extremist training not high on the priority list
Other (Please specify)

Respondent Organization Information

21. How many inmates are currently incarcerated in your facility?

22. How many personnel are assigned to your prison?

Sworn _____
Non-sworn _____

23. Identify the type of prison with which you are affiliated.

(State) (Federal) (Other, please describe)

24. Are you personally assigned to a security threat unit (STIU) or have the responsibility of collecting and reporting extremist activity for your prison?

(Yes) (No)

25. Additional comments:

(Optional) Point of contact information: Name
                                              Title
                                              Agency
                                              Address
                                              City/Town
                                              State
                                              Zip/Postal Code
                                              Telephone
                                              E-mail address

(Optional) Additional comments not covered in survey questions.

Thank you for participating in this important research. If you have any questions or comments related to this survey or my research please feel free to contact me by telephone at (386) 736-5961, x3254 or email MCoffin@vcso.us

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX B: INVITATION E-MAIL

Dear Corrections/Law Enforcement official,

I am a master's student at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval Postgraduate School conducting research to determine the extent of radicalization activities in U.S. prisons. You are invited to participate in this research study to help homeland security officials to better understand the current level of preparedness against terrorism. Participation in this study is voluntary. The purpose of this survey is to collect data from corrections and law enforcement experts to identify gaps in intelligence collection and reporting of extremist activity in U.S. prisons.

All surveys are coded to protect the identity of the respondent and their agency. At no time will information regarding specific participants or agencies be released to any individuals or institutions. While the analysis of the data and relevant comments to support the analysis will be published in the thesis, at no time will names or identifying information be used or released without prior consent.

The benefit of participating in this study is that you will be helping us to address a serious threat to the United States. There is no other compensation for your participation in this research. Any questions should be addressed to Captain Mike Coffin at (386) 736-5961, x3254 or (386) 547-0828.

Thank you for your contribution to this important research.

Captain Mike Coffin
Volusia County Sheriff's Office
DeLand, Florida
MA Student, Naval Postgraduate School
MCoffin@vcso.us

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

Anti-Defamation League. *Dangerous Convictions: An Introduction to Extremist Activities in Prisons*. Washington, D.C.: ADL, 2002, at http://www.adl.org/learn/Ext_Terr/dangerous_convictions.pdf (Accessed September 2, 2006).

Bar, Sarah, Sharon Marek, Blair Mersinger, and Louise Shelley. "An Investigation into the North African Crime-Terror Nexus." *Paper presented at the American University Transnational Crime and Terrorism Seminar*. Washington, D.C.: American University, December 19, 2005, at http://www.american.edu/traccc/resources/publications/students/bar01.pdf (Accessed March 17, 2007).

Beckford, James A. "Muslims in the Prisons of Britain and France." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 13, no.3. (2005), 287-297.

Borum, Randy. *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 2004.

Borum, Randy and Michael Ellis. "Al-Qaeda's Operational Evolution: Behavioral and Organizational Perspectives." *Behavioral Sciences and the Law* 23, no.4. (2005).

Brannan, David W., Philip F. Esler, & N.T. Anders Strindberg. "Talking to "Terrorists": Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24, no. 1 (2001): 3-24.

Breckenridge, James N. and Philip G. Zimbardo. "The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of Mass-Mediated Fear," in *Psychology of Terrorism*, eds. Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge, & Philip G. Zimbardo, 116-133. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Cilluffo, Frank, Gregory Saathoff, Jan Lane, Sharon Cardash, Josh Magarik, Andrew Whitehead, Jeffrey Raynor, Arnold Bogis, & Gina Lohr. "Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization." *A Special Report by the Homeland Security Policy Institute at The George Washington University and the Critical Incident Analysis Group at The University of Virginia*. Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University, September 2006, at http://www.heathsystem.virginia.edu/internet/ciag/publications/out_of_the_shadows.pdf (Accessed September 19, 2006).

Cohen, J. *Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 2nd ed*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988.

Copley, Gregory. "Handling radical, terrorist and politicized prisoners." *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 30, no.1. (2002): 9-12.

Dallal, Amhad. "Appropriating the Past: Twentieth-Century Reconstruction of Pre-Modern Islamic Thought." *Islamic Law and Society* 7, no.3. (2000): 325-358.

Dooghan, James K. "Muslim Prison Ministry: Hindering the Spread of the Radical, Militant, Violent and Irreconcilable Wing of Islam." *School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College*. Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2006, at https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dtic/nps23-01230701.pdf&code=5a1eaf8553d0475bebbed17ee94e713f (Accessed July 28, 2007).

Elliot, Michael. "The Shoe Bomber's World." *Time*, February 25, 2002, 47-50.

Federal Bureau of Prisons. "Inmate Population." http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp (Accessed September 7, 2006).

Gendron, Angela. "Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment." *Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs*, Carleton University Volume 2006-4 (March 2007), at http://www.carleton.ca/cciss/res_docs/itac/gendron_e.pdf (Accessed June 11, 2007).

Gerwehr, Scott and Sara Daly. "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment." In *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook*, ed. by David G. Kamien. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006.

Hudson, Rex A. *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September 1999, 24.

Jones, Seth G. "Afghan Problem is Regional." *United Press International*, July 4, 2007, at http://www.upi.com/Security_Terrorism/Analysis/2007/07/04/outside_view_afghan_problem_is_regional/5507/ (Accessed July 25, 2007).

Knox, George W. "The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat Groups (STGs) in America's Prisons Today: Recent Research Findings from the 2004 Prison Gang Survey." *National Gang Crime Research Center* (2005), at http://www.ngcrc.com/corr2006.html (Accessed September 3, 2006).

Livesey, Bruce. "The Salifist Movement." *PBS Frontline*, January 25, 2005 at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html (Accessed March 11, 2007).

Lyall, Sarah. "In Britain, Migrants Took a New Path: To Terrorism." *New York Times,* July 28, 2005, A10.

Maikovich, Andrea Kohn. "A New Understanding of Terrorism Using Cognitive Dissonance Principles." *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 35, no. 4 (2005): 373-397.

McCarthy, Terry. "L.A. Gangs are Back: With Police in Retreat and Gangsters Winning Parole, Mayhem Returns to the Streets." *Time*, September 3, 2001, 46.

Moghaddam, Fathali. *From the Terrorists' Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy.* Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006.

Morag, Nadav. Faculty, Naval Postgraduate School. Electronic communication with the author, September 14, 2006.

Mufti, Siraj Islam. "Islam in America's Prisons." *Islamonline*, August 31, 2001 at http://www.islamonline.net/english/views/2001/08/article20.shtml (Accessed August 24, 2006).

Muller, Robert S. III. *Testimony of FBI Director Robert S. Muller, III before the Senate Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate*. 109th Congress, 1st Session, February 16, 2005, at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/muller021605.htm (Accessed August 30, 2006).

Rathmell, Andrew, Olga Oliker, Terrance K. Kelley, David Brannan, & Keith Crane. *Developing Iraq's Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience*. RAND Monograph MG-365. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005.

Saathoff, Gregory B. *Testimony of Gregory B. Saathoff before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate*. 109th Congress, 2nd Session, September 19, 2006, at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/091906Saathoff.pdf (Accessed June 5, 2007).

Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terrorist Networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

San Francisco State University, Center for Integration and Improvement of Journalism. *Media Guide to Islam*. September 2004, at http://mediaguidetoislam.sfsu.edu/intheus/06c_converts.htm (Accessed August 24, 2006).

Sirkin, Harold L., Perry Keenan & Alan Jackson. "The Hard Side of Change Management." In *The Harvard Business Review on Leading Through Change*, 141-166. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, 2006.

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. *Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2005*, NCJ213133. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006.

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. *Survey of State Prison Inmates 1991*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1993.

U.S. Department of Justice, FBI Counterterrorism Division. *The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2006.

U.S. Department of Justice. "Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges Related to Conspiracy to Attack Military Facilities, Other Targets." Press release. Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2005, at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/August/05_crm_453.htm (Accessed August 9, 2006).

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. *A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Service Providers*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2004.

Victoroff, Jeff. "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 1 (February 2005): 3-42.

Walmsey, Roy. *World Prison Population List (Fifth Edition)*. London: Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Home Office, 2004, at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r234.pdf (Accessed March 12, 2007).

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam," paper presented at Yale University, *The Roots of Islamic Radicalism Conference* (May 2004), at http://www.yale.edu/polisci/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/papers/wiktorowicz-paper.pdf (Accessed September 29, 2006).

Table 1.   Prison population, manpower and type (Q22-24).

		Mean	SD	Range
Inmates currently incarcerated		1656	2395	60-14000
Numbers employed	Sworn	283	474	0-3000
	Non-sworn	189	269	0-1109
		Frequency	(%)	
Type of prison	State	34	(69.4)	
	Federal	0	(0.0)	
	*Other	15	(30.6)	
	Total	49	(100.0)	

Breakdown by type of prison		Mean		SD		Range	
		State	Other	State	Other	State	Other
Inmates currently incarcerated		1608	1765	2439	2371	60-14000	100-10000
Numbers employed	Sworn	184	501	201	770	0-800	0-3000
	Non-sworn	197	171	272	270	0-1109	0-1000

*Other included local/county jail/prison (12), private jail/prison (2), and detention center (1).

Table 2. **Ratings of how useful available resources are as sources of information and intelligence pertaining to extremist activity in prisons (Q3).**

Information/intelligence source		Poor	Fair	Good	Excell-ent	Don't know	N (%)
FBI classified reports	Freq	6	7	4	4	28	49
	(%)	(12.2)	(14.3)	(8.2)	(8.2)	(57.1)	(100)
FBI unclassified reports	Freq	6	13	3	2	25	49
	(%)	(12.2)	(26.5)	(6.1)	(4.1)	(51.0)	(100)
Federal BOP reports	Freq	5	8	9	3	24	49
	(%)	(10.2)	(16.3)	(18.4)	(6.1)	(49.0)	(100)
Other federal agency reports	Freq	7	9	11	3	19	49
	(%)	(14.3)	(18.4)	(22.4)	(6.1)	(38.8)	(100)
State office of Homeland Security	Freq	9	7	14	4	15	49
	(%)	(18.4)	(14.3)	(28.6)	(8.2)	(30.6)	(100)
Corrections professional associations	Freq	0	8	22	15	4	49
	(%)	(0.0)	(16.3)	(44.9)	(30.6)	(8.2)	(100)
Law enforcement professional associations	Freq	1	13	17	12	6	49
	(%)	(2.0)	(26.5)	(34.7)	(24.5)	(12.2)	(100)
Media (electronic or print)	Freq	11	11	18	2	7	49
	(%)	(22.4)	(22.4)	(36.7)	(4.1)	(14.3)	(100)
Internet	Freq	3	16	15	11	4	49
	(%)	(6.1)	(32.7)	(30.6)	(22.4)	(8.2)	(100)
Books, academic journals, periodicals	Freq	3	17	23	4	2	49
	(%)	(6.1)	(34.7)	(46.9)	(8.2)	(4.1)	(100)
Radical group publications	Freq	7	9	12	8	13	49
	(%)	(14.3)	(18.4)	(24.5)	(16.3)	(26.5)	(100)
Informants	Freq	3	12	14	13	7	49
	(%)	(6.1)	(24.5)	(28.6)	(26.5)	(14.3)	(100)
*Other	Freq	12	3	3	0	31	49
	(%)	(24.5)	(6.1)	(6.1)	(0.0)	(63.3)	(100)

Bold text: Most frequent response. Blue highlight indicates next most frequent to "Don't know".
* State DOCS Special Ops & IG (1); Self-reporting by inmates (1).

Table 3.   Interaction with JTTF (Q4-5).

	Response	Frequency	(%)	
Frequency of interaction with JTTF	Never	24	49.0	
	Seldom	20	40.8	
	Frequently	4	8.2	
	Very frequently	1	2.0	
	Total	49	100.0	
	Response	Frequency	(%)	(valid %)
Did this interaction relate to extremist activity?	No	8	16.3	61.5
	Yes	5	10.2	38.5
	Total	13	26.5	100.0

Table 4. **Relationship between interaction with JTTF and nature of that interaction.**

			Q4. Interact with JTTF		Total
		Frequency	Seldom	Frequently or very frequently	
5. Relate to extremist activity?	No	Observed	8	0	8
		Expected	5.5	2.5	8.0
		Std. Residual	1.0	-1.6	
	Yes	Observed	1	4	5
		Expected	3.5	1.5	5.0
		Std. Residual	-1.3	2.0	
Total		Observed	9	4	13
		Expected	9.0	4.0	13.0
	Value	df	p-value (2-sided)		
Pearson χ^2	9.244	1	.002		

Table 5. **Internal reporting of extremist activity (Q10-11).**

	Response	Frequency	(%)	
How frequently extremist activity is reported within area of responsibility	Never	5	(10.2)	
	Seldom	24	(49.0)	
	Frequently	17	(34.7)	
	Very frequently	3	(6.1)	
	Total	49	(100.0)	
	Response	Frequency	(%)	(valid %)
How extremist activity is reported	Verbally	12	(24.5)	(29.3)
	Written report	19	(38.8)	(46.3)
	Electronically	10	(20.4)	(24.4)
	Other	0	(0.0)	(0.0)
	Total	41	(83.7)	(100.0)

Table 6. **Relationship between reporting of extremity activity (Q10) and existing policies for facilitating the reporting of extremist activity (Q16).**

			10. How frequently do you report extremist activity within area of responsibility?		Total
			Never or Seldom	Frequently or very frequently	
16. Does your prison have written policies related to identifying and reporting of extremist activity?	No	Observed	14	1	15
		Expected	8.6	6.4	15.0
		Std. Residual	1.8	-2.1	
	Yes	Observed	13	19	32
		Expected	18.4	13.6	32.0
		Std. Residual	-1.3	1.5	
Total		Observed	27	20	47
		Expected	27.0	20.0	47.0

Chi-square test

	Value	df	p-value		
Pearson χ^2	11.607	1	.001		

Logistic regression

							95% CI for Odds ratio	
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	p-value	Odds ratio	Lower	Upper
Q16	3.018	1.096	7.587	1	.006	20.456	2.388	175.208
Constant	-5.657	2.101	7.250	1	.007	.003		

Table 7. **Relationship between reporting of extremity activity (Q10) and extremist group/radicalization covered in certification curriculum (Q17).**

			10. How frequently do you report extremist activity within area of responsibility?		
			Never or Seldom	Frequently or very frequently	
17. Is radicalization or extremist group training covered in your basic certification curriculum?	Not covered	Observed	10	1	11
		Expected	6.7	4.3	11.0
		Std. Residual	1.3	-1.6	
	Somewhat Covered	Observed	14	9	23
		Expected	14.0	9.0	23.0
		Std. Residual	.0	.0	
	Covered	Observed	4	6	10
		Expected	6.1	3.9	10.0
		Std. Residual	-.8	1.1	
	Well Covered	Observed	0	2	2
		Expected	1.2	.8	2.0
		Std. Residual	-1.1	1.4	
Total		Observed	28	18	46
		Expected	28.0	18.0	46.0

Chi-square test

	Value	df	p-value		
Pearson χ^2	9.107	3	.028		

Logistic regression

							95% CI for Odds ratio	
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	p-value	Odds ratio	Lower	Upper
Q17	1.357	.505	7.224	1	.007	3.885	1.444	10.453
Constant	-3.326	1.140	8.506	1	.004	.036		

Table 8.   External reporting of extremist activity (Q12-13).

	Response	Frequency	(%)	
Information shared with law enforcement outside prison	Yes	33	(67.3)	
	No	5	(10.2)	
	Uncertain	11	(22.4)	
	Total	49	(100.0)	
	Response	Frequency	(%)	(valid %)
How is this information shared?	Verbally	9	(18.4)	(26.5)
	Written report	9	(18.4)	(26.5)
	Electronically	7	(14.3)	(20.6)
	Intelligence report	6	(12.2)	(17.6)
	Uncertain	3	(6.1)	(8.8)
	Total	34	(69.4)	100.0)

Table 9. **Relationship between sharing of information with external law enforcement (Q12) and attitudes on adequacy of training (Q19).**

			19. Is the available training adequate to address the problem of radicalization and extremist group activity as you see it?			Total
			Not adequate	Somewhat adequate	Adequate	
12. Shared with law enforcement /corrections outside prison?	Yes	Observed	5	19	9	33
		Expected	9.4	17.5	6.1	33.0
		Std. Residual	-1.4	.4	1.2	
	No	Observed	5	0	0	5
		Expected	1.4	2.7	.9	5.0
		Std. Residual	3.0	-1.6	-1.0	
	Uncertain	Observed	4	7	0	11
		Expected	3.1	5.8	2.0	11.0
		Std. Residual	.5	.5	-1.4	
Total		Observed	14	26	9	49
		Expected	14.0	26.0	9.0	49.0
Chi-square test						
	Value	df	p-value			
Pearson χ^2	18.618	4	.001			

Table 10. **Receiving information and intelligence from other areas of responsibility, extracted from open-ended questions (Q14-15).**

	Response category or theme	Frequency	(%)
How is information of extremist activity from other areas of responsibility received?	Does not happen/ None	5	(10.2)
	Verbally/ meetings/ phone calls	6	(12.2)
	Written reports/ incident report/ memos	11	(22.4)
	Electronic/ e-mail/ internet	7	(14.3)
	Combination of verbal/written/electronic	10	(20.4)
	STG Supervisor	3	(6.1)
	Other internal/ external sources	1	(2.0)
	Did not understand question	4	(8.2)
	Total	49	(100.0)
	Response category or theme	Frequency	(%)
How is intelligence related to extremist activity from other prisons received?	Does not happen/None	8	(16.3)
	Verbally/ meetings/ phone calls	3	(6.1)
	Written reports/ incident report/ memos	8	(16.3)
	Electronic/ e-mail/ internet	11	(22.4)
	Combination of verbal/written/electronic	12	(24.5)
	STG Supervisor	4	(8.2)
	Other internal/ external sources	2	(4.1)
	Did not understand question	1	(2.0)
	Total	49	(100.0)

Table 11.   Dedicated STIU and their responsibilities (Q6-9).

	Response	Frequency	(%)	
Prison has dedicated STIU	No	12	(24.5)	
	Yes	37	(75.5)	
	Total	49	(100.0)	
	*Response	Frequency	(%)	(% of Yes)
	Investigation	30	(61.2)	(81.1)
Responsibilities of STIU personnel	Intelligence collection	34	(69.4)	(91.9)
	Analysis/reporting	26	(53.1)	(70.3)
	Training	25	(51.0)	(67.6)
	Liaison	27	(55.1)	(73.0)

Statistics below include responses for only those who answered Yes for dedicated STIU unit (n=37)

	Response	Frequency	(%)	
Increased number of STIU personnel within last 5 years	No	21	(56.8)	
	Yes	16	(43.2)	
	†Response	Frequency	(%)	
	Did not disclose number	4	(10.8)	
Numbers currently assigned to STIUs	1 to 4	21	(56.8)	
	4 to 9	4	(10.8)	
	10-19	5	(13.5)	
	>20	3	(8.1)	

* Multiple response question
              † Responses from categorization of numerical values entered

Table 12. Relationship between existence of dedicated STIU (Q6) and extremist group training in certification curriculum (Q17).

			6. Dedicated unit, section, group, or individual?		Total
			No	Yes	
17. Is radicalization or extremist group training covered in your basic certification curriculum?	Not covered	Observed	6	8	14
		Expected	3.4	10.6	14.0
		Std. Residual	1.4	-.8	
	Covered (to any degree)	Observed	6	29	35
		Expected	8.6	26.4	35.0
		Std. Residual	-.9	.5	
Total		Observed	12	37	49
		Expected	12.0	37.0	49.0

Chi-square test

	Value	df	p-value		
Pearson χ^2	3.576	1	.059		

Logistic regression

							95% CI for Odds ratio	
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	p-value	Odds ratio	Lower	Upper
Q17	1.671	.627	7.092	1	.008	5.315	1.554	18.174
Constant	-2.050	1.128	3.302	1	.069	.129		

Table 13.　　Relationship between existence of dedicated STIU (Q6) and attitudes on adequacy of training (Q19).

			6. Dedicated unit, section, group, or individual?		Total
			No	Yes	
19. Is the available training adequate to address the problem of radicalization and extremist group activity as you see it?	Not adequate	Observed	6	8	14
		Expected	3.4	10.6	14.0
		Std. Residual	1.4	-.8	
	Somewhat adequate	Observed	6	20	26
		Expected	6.4	19.6	26.0
		Std. Residual	-.1	.1	
	Adequate	Observed	0	9	9
		Expected	2.2	6.8	9.0
		Std. Residual	-1.5	.8	
Total		Observed	12	37	49
		Expected	12.0	37.0	49.0

Chi-square test

	Value	df	p-value		
Pearson χ^2	5.501	2	.064		

Logistic regression

							95% CI for Odds ratio	
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	p-value	Odds ratio	Lower	Upper
Q19	1.317	.590	4.976	1	.026	3.732	1.173	11.869
Constant	-1.183	1.023	1.337	1	.248	.306		

Table 14.   Rating of activity level of known extremist groups within the prisons (Q1).

Extremist groups		Not present	Somewhat active	Active	Very active	N (%)
Prison gangs (Bloods, Crips, Latin Kings, etc.)	Freq	4	**22**	13	9	48
	(%)	(8.2)	**(44.9)**	(26.5)	(18.4)	(98.0)
Religious (Muslim, Christian, etc.)	Freq	9	**28**	7	4	48
	(%)	(18.4)	**(57.1)**	(14.3)	(8.2)	(98.0)
Right-wing (Racists, fascists, Skinheads, KKK, Aryan, etc.)	Freq	17	**21**	7	3	48
	(%)	(34.7)	**(42.9)**	(14.3)	(6.1)	(98.0)
Left-wing (ELF, ALF, Weather Underground, etc.)]	Freq	**40**	7	0	1	48
	(%)	**(81.6)**	(14.3)	(0.0)	(2.0)	(98.0)
Anti-government	Freq	**33**	12	2	1	48
	(%)	**(67.3)**	(24.5)	(4.1)	(2.0)	(98.0)
*Other	Freq	**43**	5	0	0	48
	(%)	**(87.8)**	(10.2)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(98.0)

Bold text: Most frequent response
*Other include Local/temporal/general crime gangs (3), Mexican Mafia (1), Mafiosi (1)

**Table 15.   Ratings of strength of the connection of the extremist groups'
activities to their colleagues outside prison (Q2).**

Extremist groups		Not present	Somewhat strong	Strong	Very strong	N (%)
Prison gangs (Bloods, Crips, Latin Kings, etc.)	Freq	8	**18**	10	13	49
	(%)	(16.3)	**(36.7)**	(20.4)	(26.5)	(100)
Religious (Muslim, Christian, etc.)	Freq	15	**23**	7	4	49
	(%)	(30.6)	**(46.9)**	(14.3)	(8.2)	(100)
Right-wing (Racists, fascists, Skinheads, KKK, Aryan, etc.)	Freq	**23**	15	7	4	49
	(%)	**(46.9)**	(30.6)	(14.3)	(8.2)	(100)
Left-wing (ELF, ALF, Weather Underground, etc.)]	Freq	**41**	5	1	2	49
	(%)	**(83.7)**	(10.2)	(2.0)	(4.1)	(100)
Anti-government	Freq	**37**	8	2	2	49
	(%)	**(75.5)**	(16.3)	(4.1)	(4.1)	(100)
*Other	Freq	**46**	1	2	0	49
	(%)	**(93.9)**	(2.0)	(4.1)	(0.0)	(100)

Bold text: Most frequent response
*Other include Local/temporal/general crime gangs (1), Mexican Mafia (1), Mafiosi (1)

Table 16. **Correlation among ratings of extremist group activity in prisons (Q1).**

Extremist groups		Relig. groups	Right-wing	Left-wing	Anti-gov.	Other
Prison gangs (Bloods, Crips, Latin Kings, etc.)	r	**.458**	.181	.163	.250	.097
	p	**.001**	.217	.267	.087	.511
Religious (Muslim, Christian, etc.)	r		.272	.185	**.405**	.196
	p		.062	.208	**.004**	.181
Right-wing (Racists, fascists, Skinheads, KKK, Aryan, etc.)	r			**.473**	.385	.314
	p			**.001**	.007	.030
Left-wing (ELF, ALF, Weather Underground, etc.)]	r				**.567**	.384
	p				**.000**	.007
Anti-government	r					**.455**
	p					**.001**

Bold text: Significant Spearman (non-parametric) correlations (r>.4, p<.005).

Table 17. **Correlation among ratings of extremist group strength of connection to colleagues outside prisons (Q2).**

Extremist groups		Relig. groups	Right- wing	Left- wing	Anti- gov.	Other
Prison gangs (Bloods, Crips, Latin Kings, etc.)	r	**.576**	**.461**	.236	**.414**	.112
	p	**.000**	**.001**	.102	**.003**	.445
Religious (Muslim, Christian, etc.)	r		**.423**	**.465**	**.553**	.039
	p		**.002**	**.001**	**.000**	.791
Right-wing (Racists, fascists, Skinheads, KKK, Aryan, etc.)	r			.240	**.410**	.262
	p			.097	**.003**	.069
Left-wing (ELF, ALF, Weather Underground, etc.)]	r				**.707**	.314
	p				**.000**	.028
Anti-government	r					.396
	p					.005

Bold text: Significant Spearman (non-parametric) correlations (r>.4, p<.005).

Table 18.   Reporting policies and related training (Q16-17).

	Response	Frequency	(%)	
Has written policies related to identifying and reporting of extremist activity	Yes	32	(65.3)	
	No	15	(30.6)	
	Uncertain	2	(4.1)	
	Total	49	(100.0)	
	Response	Frequency	(%)	
Radicalization or extremist group training covered in basic certification curriculum	Not covered	11	(22.4)	
	Somewhat covered	23	(46.9)	
	Covered	10	(20.4)	
	Well covered	2	(4.1)	
	Uncertain	3	(6.1)	
	Total	49	(100.0)	

Table 19.   Attitudes regarding adequacy of training (Q19, 21).

	Response	Frequency	(%)	
Available training adequate to address problem of radicalization	Not adequate	14	(28.6)	
	Somewhat adequate	26	(53.1)	
	Adequate	9	(18.4)	
	Total	49	(100.0)	
	*Response	Frequency	(%)	
Barriers to obtaining more training related to radicalization and extremist group activity	Training unavailable in area	17	(34.7)	
	Lack of local funding	29	(59.2)	
	Lack of federal funding	14	(28.6)	
	Not high priority	29	(59.2)	

* Multiple response question

Table 20. **Relationship between available training adequate to address problem of radicalization (Q19) and radicalization or extremist group training covered in basic certification curriculum (Q17).**

			19. Is the available training adequate to address the problem of radicalization and extremist group activity as you see it?		Total
			Not adequate	Adequate	
17. Is radicalization or extremist group training covered in your basic certification curriculum?	Not covered	Observed	9	5	14
		Expected	4.0	10.0	14.0
		Std. Residual	2.5	-1.6	
	Covered	Observed	5	30	35
		Expected	10.0	25.0	35.0
		Std. Residual	-1.6	1.0	
Total		Observed	14	35	49
		Expected	14.0	35.0	49.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	p-value		
Pearson Chi-Square	12.250	1	.000		

Logistic Regression

							95% CI for Odds ratio	
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	p-value	Odds ratio	Lower	Upper
Q17	2.380	.738	10.400	1	.001	10.800	2.543	45.866
Constant	-2.967	1.216	5.958	1	.015	.051		

Table 21. Education and training available and needed. Extracted from open-ended questions (Q18, 20).

	Response category or theme	Frequency	(%)
What type of education and training is available that identifies indicators of radicalization and extremist activity?	None/ Don't know/ Unsure	12	(24.5)
	Gang identification/ awareness training	8	(16.3)
	STG training	7	(14.3)
	Seminars/ annual meetings	3	(6.1)
	Basic/ in-service training	12	(24.5)
	Intelligence training/ classes	3	(6.1)
	Response not relevant/ understood	4	(8.2)
	Total	49	(100.0)
	Response category or theme	Frequency	(%)
What type of additional education and training would be beneficial?	None/ Don't know/ Unsure	10	(20.4)
	Current events/ trends awareness	10	(20.4)
	Specific radicalization training/ awareness	8	(16.3)
	Info sharing/ inter-agency communication	7	(14.3)
	Intelligence gathering & analysis	4	(8.2)
	General education/ Classroom training	7	(14.3)
	Response not relevant/ understood	3	(6.1)
	Total	49	(100.0)

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

3. David Brannan, PhD.
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

4. Lauren Wollman, PhD.
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California